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ABSTRACT 
Over time, we have grown increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters. 
Each decade, economic losses from such disasters more than double as people 
continue to build homes, businesses, and other physical infrastructure in 
hazardous places. Yet public policy has thus far failed to address the unique 
problems posed by natural disasters. This Article takes a first step toward 
improving public policy by offering a paradigm for understanding its failures, 
suggesting that three categories of obstacles obstruct sensible government 
regulation. 
Drawing from philosophy, cognitive psychology, history, anthropology, 
and political science, this Article identifies and analyzes three categories of 
obstacles to disaster policy-symbolic obstacles, cognitive obstacles, and 
structural obstacles. The way we talk about natural disaster, the way we think 
about the risks of building in hazardous places, and structural aspects of 
American political institutions all favor development over restraint. Indeed, 
these forces have such strength that in most circumstances society automatically 
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank 
Federico Cheever, Brigham Daniels, john Echeverria, Nancy Leong, justin Marceau, Peter Byrne, 
Michael Wara, and Annecoos Wiersema for their thoughtful comments. I would also like to 
thank Elizabeth Hutchinson and Courtney Mcvean for their outstanding work as my research 
assistants. 
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and thoughtlessly responds to natural disasters by beginning to rebuild as soon 
as a disaster has occurred. 
The types of obstacles discussed in this Article interact and amplify one 
another, further impeding policymaking. The history of disaster policy suggests 
that efforts to respond to any one obstacle will likely fail. Only by 
understanding these obstacles collectively, and by coordinating responses to 
their individual and cumulative effects, can America effectively tackle the 
natural disaster problems it faces. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 29, 2012, Superstorm Sandy swept through the 
northeastern United States. Coastal communities experienced a 
record-setting storm surge that reached more than thirteen feet. 1 
Waves topped thirty feet outside of New York Harbor and grew to 
almost forty feet in Atlantic City, New Jersey.2 In all, parts of seven 
states received more than five inches of rain during the storm's 
course.3 This rare event swept through many of the same areas 
devastated only the year before by Hurricane Irene, 4 causing New 
York Governor Andrew Cuomo to quip "we have a 1 00-year flood 
every two years now."5 
Natural disasters are a recurring feature of the American 
experience. In 2011 there were ninety-nine federally declared, major 
natural disasters in the United States.6 They came in all shapes and 
1. National Hurricane Ctr., Post-Tropical Cyclone SANDY Update Statement (Oct. 29, 2012), 
available at http:/ /www.nhc.noaa.gov/text/refresh/MIATCUA T3 +shtml! 292256.shtml. 
2. See The Stats Are in: Superstorm Sandy Totals, ACCUWEATHER.COM (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http:/ /www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/sandy-statistics-rain-wind-snow/876665; 
National Hurricane Ctr., Post-Tropical Cyclone SANDY Update Statement (Oct. 29, 2012), available at 
http:/ /www.nhc.noaa.gov /text/refresh/MIA TCUA T3 + shtml/292256.shtml. 
3. Id. 
4. See, e.g., David Ariosto, First Irene, Then Sandy: jersey City Recovers, Again, CNN WIRE 
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/14/us/new-jersey-irene-sandy/. 
5. Jimmy Vielkind, Cuomo: Need to Rebuild for 'New Reality', CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (Oct. 
31, 20 12), http:/ /blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/162627 /cuomo-we-need-to-plan-
rebuild-for-new-reality. 
6. See Natural Disasters: Counting the Cost of Calamities, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2012, at 60. 
The year 2011 was a record year for disasters, but other years are not far behind. There were, for 
example, seventy-eight disaster declarations in 2004. See E.L. Quarantelli, et a!., A Heuristic 
Approach to Future Disasters and Crises: New, Old, and In-Between Types, in HANDBOOK OF DISASTER 
RESEARCH 16, 35 (Havian Rodriguez, et a!., eds. 2006). By some estimates, more than 200 
natural catastrophes occur each year around the globe. I d. at 18. 
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sizes: wildfires, floods, blizzards, hurricanes, and earthquakes. 7 
Hurricane Irene is a good example, tearing through New England at 
the end of August 2011. In the wake of the storm, streams and rivers 
flooded, destroying homes, businesses, and roads, and causing over 
$15 billion in damage. 8 Hurricane Irene, like the other ninety-eight 
major disasters of 2011, 9 was a tragedy for many people. Like most 
natural events that result in massive economic loss, the storm was 
also a predictable, albeit rare, event. Much of the flooding that swept 
away memories and livelihoods occurred in areas predicted to flood, 
on average, once every hundred years. 10 But, as Governor Cuomo 
recognized, such floods sometimes strike in rapid succession. 11 
These events are referred to as "natural" disasters because they 
are precipitated by natural forces. But the behavior of humans-
where we locate and how we build our homes, businesses, and 
roads-plays a leading role in transforming events into disasters. 12 
7. See Natural Disasters: Counting the Cost of Calamities, supra note 6 at 60; Storm Leaves Trail 
of Snow, Ice, Power Outages, Freezing Temperatures, ABC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2012 3:23 PM), 
http:/ I abcnews.go.com/US/blizzard-20 11-mega-snowstorm-pounds-midwest -snow-
ice/story?id = 12818948#. UJAK12125V g. 
8. Costliest U.S. Hurricanes, WUNDERGROUND (Oct. 25, 2012, 5:43PM), http://www.wund 
erground.com/hurricane/damage.asp. By the time Hurricane Irene reached New England, its 
winds had slowed enough that it had become a tropical storm. See Marc Santora, High and Dry?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at Section RE. This Article refers to the storm in total as "Hurricane 
Irene" to avoid confusion. 
9. Disaster Declarations by Year, FEMA.GOV, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
10. See, e.g., Jeff Masters, Irene's 1-in-100 Year Rains Trigger Deadly Flooding, WUNDERBLOG 
(Aug. 29, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html? 
entrynum= 1908. 
11. Repeated flooding in hundred-year-flood plains can occur for one of two reasons. 
First, as a matter of pure probability, the chances of such flooding occurring in consecutive years 
is one in one thousand, reasonable odds in light of the extensive network of floodplains that 
occur in the United States. See, e.g., Mark Crowell, eta!., An Estimate of the U.S. Population Living in 
100-Year Coastal Flood Hazard Areas, 26]. CoASTAL RES. 201, 208 (2010) (estimating that more 
than eight million people live in areas subject to a one-percent risk of coastal flooding). Second, 
estimates of the likelihood of flooding may quickly become out of date as new development 
increases flood risk. See infra note 26. 
12. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 3 (2d ed. 2010). As Daniel 
Farber and his colleagues have explained, "[M]ost serious students of disaster have moved from 
defining a disaster as the hazardous event itself to defining a disaster in terms of the impact that 
the hazardous event has on people and property-an impact that is determined not only by the 
magnitude of the event, but also by human interaction with nature, by our choices about where 
and how we live." Id. Recognizing the responsibility of human decision making, some have 
proposed that the term "nature-induced disaster" more accurately captures the phenomenon. See 
Christian Pfister, Learning from Nature-Induced Disasters, Theoretical Considerations and Case Studies 
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Hurricane Irene's rain may have caused rivers and streams to overtop 
their banks, but a flood only becomes a disaster if human 
infrastructure lies in its path. 13 Indeed, the armoring of rivers, 
hardening of floodplains, and development of watersheds increases 
the severity of the flood itself. In a very real sense, the strength of 
Hurricane Irene, at least as people experienced it, was the result of 
policies that facilitated and permitted development in floodplains. 
Natural disasters are, then, significantly a function of the built 
environment, rather than stochastic natural forces. 
Scholars have long recognized the role humans play in 
transforming natural events into natural disasters. As Phil O'Keefe 
and his colleagues wrote in a 1976 path-breaking article in the 
journal Nature, "[w]ithout people there is no disaster." 14 O'Keefe 
recognized the profundity of this realization and argued that "[t]he 
time is ripe for some form of precautionary planning which considers 
vulnerability of the population as the real cause of disaster-a 
vulnerability that is induced by socio-economic conditions that can 
be modified by man, and is not just an act of God."15 
Unfortunately, in the thirty-five years since, society has done a 
poor job accounting for its starring role in the genesis of natural 
disaster. There have been repeated calls for reform. 16 Most recently, 
a joint committee of the National Academies of Sciences, the 
National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine 
released a report entitled "Disaster Resilience: A National 
Imperative," reiterating the importance and urgency of reducing the 
nation's vulnerability to natural disasters. 17 Notwithstanding this 
from Western Europe, in NATURAL DISASTERS, CULTURAL RESPONSES, 17, 18 (Christof Mauch & 
Christian Pfister eds., 2009). This Article uses the familiar nomenclature because of its wide-
spread adoption. 
13. See, e.g., Christo[ Mauch, Introduction to NATURAL DISASTERS, CULTURAL RESPONSES, 
supra note 12, at 4 (explaining that natural disasters "should be understood as both physical 
events and social or cultural occurrences"). 
14. Phil O'Keefe et al., Taking the Naturalness Out of Natural Disasters, 260 NATURE 566, 566 
(1976). 
15. !d. at 567. 
16. DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (1999) (arguing that in light of sustained failure to reduce losses from disaster 
"the nation must shift to a policy of 'sustainable hazard mitigation'"). 
17. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE vii (2012) 
(arguing that the nation should "embark on a new path-one that . . recognizes and rewards 
the values of resilience to the individual, household, community, and the nation"). Notably, 
many of the policy prescriptions advocated for by those concerned with disaster policy remain 
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sustained concern with disaster vulnerability, development continues 
at an explosive pace in areas of extreme hazard. Florida, for example, 
a state facing hurricane risk so severe that private insurance 
companies have largely refused to issue policies covering wind 
damage, has also experienced one of the highest growth rates in the 
country. 18 Within Florida, development is concentrated in counties 
facing particularly acute hurricane risks. The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration estimates that St. Lucie County will be 
struck by a hurricane an average of once every eight years and a 
major hurricane an average of once every nineteen years. 19 Yet the 
population in St. Lucie County increased by more than forty percent 
between 2000 and 2010, as did the number of housing units. 20 The 
same is true of development subject to other natural hazards. Living 
along the boundary between urban areas and wild lands has become 
increasingly popular, despite the high risk posed by wildfire. The 
Department of Agriculture predicts that by 2030 more than 2.2 
million homes will be located at the fire-prone, wildness-urban 
relatively constant. These strategies include implementation of stronger building codes, better 
land-use planning through local zoning decisions to channel development away from hazard-
prone areas, and use of insurance instruments to better price risk. See id. at 179-180, 182-83; 
MILETI, supra note 16, at 155-74. 
18. See, e.g., juSTIN R. PIDOT, COASTAL DISASTER INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL 
WARMING: THE CASE FOR RELYING ON THE PRIVATE MARKET 8, 11 (2007) (identifying decisions by 
insurance companies to stop providing insurance in certain hurricane-prone areas, including 
Florida); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann 0. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of Large-
Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1810 (2006) 
(explaining that in the wake of the 2004-2005 hurricane season "insurers and reinsurers are 
reexamining their ability to provide protection against wind damage from hurricanes and are 
asking whether these events are insurable, and if so, at what price"); see also Julie Patel, State 
Farm Dumps Policies into Citizens, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 19,2011 (describing growth in number of 
state-backed wind insurance policies as largest private insurer in Florida shed coverage). 
19. See Return Period Hurricane, http:/ /www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/images/return _hurr. 
jpg (last visited Sept. 11, 2012); Return Period Major Hurricane, http:/ /www.nhc.noaa. 
gov/climo/images/return_mjrhurr.jpg (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). This information about 
direct strikes underestimates risks to development because it does not include indirect strikes or 
tropical storms. 
20. According to the 2000 census, there were 192,695 people and 91,262 housing units in 
St. Lucie County. The 2010 census reports 277,789 people and 137,029 housing units. See U.S. 
CENSUS, available at http:/ /factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (select 
"Geographies" button; then select "County" from drop down menu; then select "florida;" then 
select "St. Lucie County;" then select the "Population" link; to change census years select the 
"Topics" link). 
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interface in the Rocky Mountains, a forty percent increase from 
2006. 21 
In light of abundant documentation of the risk of building in 
areas subject to natural hazards and repeated calls for reform, why 
do we remain on a reckless course that places more people, 
buildings, and infrastructure in harm's way? This Article takes up 
that important question, identifying three categories of obstacles 
that impede the adoption of thoughtful, proactive policies to guide 
development in hazardous areas. These categories-symbolic, 
cognitive, and structural-reinforce one another, collectively causing 
society to make bad decisions both before disaster strikes and in its 
wake. 
In discussing these obstacles, I do not write on an entirely blank 
slate. Others have considered patterns of thinking and structures of 
government that impede disaster policy.22 But this Article's 
comprehensive and structured approach offers important lessons for 
those seeking to enact reform. It offers the critical insight that 
symbolic, cognitive, and structural obstacles reinforce one another, 
and, moreover, explains how this cumulative effect occurs. So, for 
example, the symbolic importance attached to reconstruction in the 
wake of disaster may reinforce cognitive mechanisms that distort 
perceptions of risk. In turn, these cognitive mechanisms may amplify 
policy distortions created by structural aspects of the government 
entities charged with formulating disaster policy. As a result, 
creating regulation that embodies a sustained commitment to reduce 
vulnerability to natural disaster is likely to succeed only if it is 
supported by policies that account for all three of the obstacles 
identified here and their interactions. 
In light of this reality, better understanding the obstacles facing 
disaster policy will enable society to respond to natural hazards more 
appropriately. Each type of obstacle lends itself to different 
responses. Symbolic obstacles generally require a discursive remedy. 
21. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., WESTERN REGION, AUDIT REPORT: 
FOREST SERVICE LARGE FIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS, Rep. No. 08601-44-SF, at 6 (2006). 
22. See, e.g., Raymond]. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster 
Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. 
& Soc. Sci. 171, 173-81 (2006) [hereinafter Burby, Paradoxes] (arguing that natural disaster 
policy suffers from a "safe development paradox" and a "local government paradox"); Howard 
Kunreuthcr & Mark Pauly, Neglecting Disaster: Why Don't People Insure Against Large Losses?, 28 ]. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 6-7 (2004) (contending that limited information, transaction costs, and 
assumptions that low-level risks will not occur lead to underinsurance). 
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Cognitive obstacles require debiasing strategies to correct for 
systematic errors of cognition. Finally, structural obstacles require 
redesigning political institutions responsible for disaster policy. A 
comprehensive policy that harnesses multiple strategies to address 
all three obstacles is most likely to result in a successful and 
sustained effort to reduce vulnerability to natural disaster. 
Existing approaches to disaster policy have failed, at least in part, 
because they have failed to account for all three obstacles and the 
interaction among them. Consider, for example, the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP), which requires communities to impose 
standards for new construction within one-hundred-year floodplains 
to enable their residents to purchase insurance.23 Theoretically, the 
NFIP should lead to better development practices by pricing hazard 
risk. In reality, the NFIP has been a colossal failure, significantly 
increasing development in floodplains and resulting in staggering 
losses that must be paid by the federal treasury. 24 Critics of the NFIP 
have long blamed subsidized insurance premiums as largely 
responsible for this failure, 25 and there is little doubt that the 
practice of underpricing risk has encouraged development.26 But the 
NFIP also does little to address structural obstacles to effective 
disaster policy.27 Nor has the NFIP shifted the discourse 
23. See, e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c) (2) (requiring local governments to restrict new 
development in certain designated floodplains such that the "lowest floor (including basement) 
[is] elevated to or above the base flood level"); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL 
ISSUES, GA0-10-1063T, at 4 (2010) [hereinafter NFIP ACTIONS NEEDED] (providing background 
on NFIP). 
24. See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 14-17; Raymond]. Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain 
Management: The US Experience, 3 ENVTL. HAZARDS Ill, 116-17 (200 I). 
25. See Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual 
Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991, 2004 (arguing that through 
provision of "artificial insurance rates," the federal government is "complicit[]" in "exacerbating 
disaster risks"); NFIP ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 23, at 6 ("[T]he number of policies receiving 
subsidized rates has grown steadily in recent years and without changes to the program will 
likely continue to grow, increasing the potential for future NFIP operating deficits."). 
26. See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 14-15. The federal government's failure to keep flood 
maps up-to-date has also caused problems for the program. See RAWLE 0. KING, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, CHALLENGES, AND 
FINANCIAL STATUS 12-13 (2011) ("FEMA has been criticized by community officials and 
property owners with respect to flood-control infrastructure protection and its risk mapping 
process."); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA's RATE-SETTING PROCESS 
WARRANTS ATTENTION, GA0-09-12, at 3 (2008) ("[T]he data that FEMA uses to define flood 
probabilities are outdated or inaccurate."). 
27. The NFIP does require local communities to adopt building code standards to reduce 
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surrounding floods to address the perceived symbolic importance of 
reconstruction. Indeed, the program's practice of paying out repeated 
claims by the same policyholder28 enables and even encourages the 
kind of constant reconstruction called for by the symbolism attached 
to natural disasters and the human responses they engender. 
The import of this Article is that the multifaceted, systematic 
problems facing disaster policy require multifaceted, systematic 
reform. This resonates with calls by other scholars for radical 
rethinking of how society interacts with natural hazards. These 
suggestions often seem self-evident in theory, if unthinkable in 
practice.29 Lisa Grow Sun, for example, has suggested that 
communities should carefull~ consider rebuilding in hazard-prone 
locations following disaster. 0 While the wisdom of this call for 
introspection may be gaining some traction, 31 it has rarely carried 
the day. Even as erosion has battered the highway connecting the 
Outer Banks of North Carolina, requiring almost $100 million in 
repairs since 1983, local leaders vehemently oppose any proposal to 
remove the road as "unscientific" and "portend[ing] financial 
disaster."32 This refusal to react to natural conditions by relocating 
has long been true of human societies. Between the twelfth century 
and the nineteenth century, only forty-two cities worldwide were 
permanently abandoned following catastrophe.33 Today, 
reconstruction in the wake of disaster is virtually assured. 
the damage caused by flooding but enforcement of these standards remains with the local 
governments. In at least some communities, local government officials have failed to enforce, or 
even understand these standards, resulting in considerable property loss. See Burby, Paradoxes, 
supra note 22, at 178-79. 
28. See PI DOT, supra note 18, at 15. 
29. Even seemingly improbable ideas have gained traction in certain areas beset by 
natural hazards. So, for example, the President of the Maldives Islands has discussed the 
possibility of purchasing land in Australia to relocate the Maldivian population as the climate-
related sea level rise causes the nation to disappear. See Ben Doherty, Climate Change Castaways 
Consider Move to Australia, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, jan. 7, 2012, at Section "News & Features." 
30. Lisa Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the Future of the 
American City, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2157 [hereinafter Sun, Smart Growth]. 
31. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, A Dilemma, A Promise, A Voice: After the Storm: On Flood Plain, 
Pondering Wisdom of Rebuilding Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, at Al3. 
32. See Cornelia Dean, A Lifeline Built on Shifting Sands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at 01 
(quoting a statement by NC-20, an organization of public officials and businesspeople from 
twenty waterfront counties). 
33. Quarantelli eta!., supra note 6, at 21. This number reflects the abandonment of cities 
following both natural- and human-caused disasters. Id. Relocation following natural disaster, 
then, is rarer still. 
220 
213 Deconstructing Disaster 
Even before storms strike, local governments face stiff 
opposition to sensible regulation. Efforts to restrict development on 
land subject to flooding every ten years, 34 or simply to require sellers 
to notify potential buyers that property lies within a twenty-five-year 
floodplain, consistently face stiff and often successful opposition.35 
To explain this phenomenon that places increasing numbers of 
people and development dollars in harm's way, this Article proceeds 
in three parts. 
Part II examines symbolic obstacles to disaster policy that arise 
out of language and metaphor. Natural disasters are often viewed 
through the lens of a conflict in which nature is the aggressor and 
humans are the victim. This metaphor is appealingly colorful and 
resonates with significant public concern about terrorism and war. 
And natural disaster and armed conflict share similarities in terms of 
the devastation they can cause and the social resources needed in 
their immediate aftermath. But the metaphor of armed conflict 
burdens natural disaster response with symbolic baggage. If natural 
disaster represents attack, failure to rebuild represents capitulation 
and retreat. In the context of terrorism and war, it may make sense 
to demonstrate that America remains steadfast, and rebuilding that 
which has been destroyed serves as a symbolic victory over a 
sometimes-elusive enemy. Placing people and infrastructure in the 
path of natural disasters should not be viewed as a similar victory. 
The cultural impetus to rebuild arising out of the armed conflict 
metaphor reinforces innate cognitive processes, addressed in Part III, 
which cause the human brain to systematically misperceive natural 
hazard risks. Cognitive psychology has identified mechanisms that 
result in erroneous risk perception, and these mechanisms, often 
referred to as heuristics, cause special problems with regard to low-
frequency, high-severity risks. High-salience risks, such as the risk of 
terrorist attack, tend to be magnified, but other risks, and natural 
risks in particular, tend to be downplayed. As the result of a 
combination of cognitive processes, natural hazards may be acutely 
underappreciated. This operates directly on policymakers by shaping 
their perceptions both of appropriate policies and also the relative 
importance of different problems. Even where policymakers acquire 
sufficient information to develop a relatively sophisticated sense of 
34. County Delays Wetlands Changes, FLA. TODAY, june 3, 2010, at Bl. 
35. Brian Haas, New Homes Plan Passes, BRADENTON HERALD, Aug. 9, 2002, at Cl. 
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the problems posed by natural hazards in their jurisdiction, these 
cognitive obstacles may shape the public appetite for restrictions on 
development. 
Symbolic and cognitive obstacles impede the development of 
sensible disaster policy, and so too does the structure of the political 
institutions charged with that policymaking. It is to these structural 
obstacles that Part IV turns. Disaster policy is dispersed through all 
levels of government and across landscapes. This diffusion causes 
perverse incentives favoring development because governments with 
primary responsibility to regulate the practices that lead to 
vulnerability pay few of the costs associated with disaster and 
capture few of the benefits of effective regulation. These vertical 
problems-whereby the federal government pays the cost of disaster 
but local governments reap the rewards of development-and 
horizontal problems-whereby the policies of neighboring local 
governments affect each other-favor development over regulation. 
In addition, the temporal dimensions of disasters and the 
relationship between their dispersed costs and the concentrated 
benefits of development lead to regulatory failures. 
To make these categories concrete, this Article will discuss the 
experience of a range of communities in states from Florida to 
California to Vermont. To illuminate the commonalities of these 
examples, the Article will primarily, although not exclusively, focus 
on flooding. Each type of natural hazard poses its own unique 
variations on the themes discussed. For example, buildings located 
in floodplains both sustain damage in floods and also increase flood 
risk by substituting impermeable surfaces for naturally absorbent 
ecosystems. The severity of other natural events, like earthquakes, 
may be less sensitive to development. The federal government also 
plays a slightly larger role in regulating flooding because it provides 
flood insurance through the NFIP and requires local governments to 
impose certain land-use controls in identified floodplains.36 Despite 
differences at the margin, the impediments to sound disaster policy 
are largely cross-cutting. 
A few months after Irene's passage, newspaperman Steven 
Pappas wrote a story envisioning an optimistic future in which "the 
36. See FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM COMMUNITY ENROLLMENT AND 
ELIGIBILITY HANDBOOK ENR-3 (2011), available at http://www.floods.org/ace-
files/ documentlibrary /State_ Local %20Resources%20and%20Tools/3.4 _ FEMA _ 553 _ Eligi bilityH 
andbook_Ol-20ll.pdf. 
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evidence" of Hurricane Irene "is hard to find." 37 But the author 
suggested that Vermont would do more than simply rebuild. 38 The 
future would include "more intelligent river management," 
infrastructure "built to higher standards," and buildings relocated 
"beyond Irene's highest flood-waters." 39 These are the right lessons 
to draw from an experience like Hurricane Irene. They are important 
lessons, particularly in light of the potential for climate change to 
increase the number and severity of extreme weather events. 40 
Moreover, they are vital lessons because of the dis,groportionate 
effect natural disasters have on vulnerable populations. 1 
Considering and responding to the obstacles to disaster policy 
can facilitate a new paradigm that puts these lessons into practice. In 
so doing, we must remain cognizant of the lives disaster policy will 
inevitably impact, particularly the lives of displaced individuals.42 A 
new paradigm may require relocation of entire communities, and 
this is a transition that society should facilitate, just as it has 
facilitated development in harm's way. However, a new paradigm is 
3 7. Steven M. Pappas, A Cultural Shift, RUTLAND HERALD, Dec. 20, 2011. 
38. Id. 
39. !d. 
40. See Sebastian Albuja & Isabel Cavelier Adarve, Protecting People Displaced by Disasters in 
the Context of Climate Change: Challenges from a Mixed Conflict/Disaster Context, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 
239, 239 (201 I) ("Climate science has provided unchallenged evidence that climate change has 
enhanced and will continue to enhance the frequency and intensity of natural hazards."); 
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 18, at 1807 ("One of the expected effects of global 
warming is an increase in hurricane intensity."); P.]. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone 
Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844 (2005) (arguing that 
there is a trend of increased hurricane activity since 1970). But see ]onny C.L. Chan, Letter to the 
Editor, Comment on "Changes in Tropical Cyclones Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming 
Environment," 311 SCIENCE 1713, 1713 (2006) (arguing that there is no demonstrated trend of 
increasing hurricane activity correlated with climate change). 
41. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, 25 LAW & lNEQ. 297, 301 (2007) 
("Disaster may rain down on all, but it only sprinkles on some, while pouring on others."); 
Richard ]. Lazarus, Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming Environmental Law by Reforming 
Environmental Lawmaking, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1019, 1027 (2007) (explaining that development in 
hazard-prone areas is often used "as homes for the poor, the elderly, and racial minorities who 
lack the economic, physical, and political resources necessary for effective evacuation when 
catastrophe hits"). Those with the fewest resources not only disproportionately live in harm's 
way, but those same communities "remain left out of the recovery and rebuilding effort." 
Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery Excludes Those 
Most in Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 23 (2006). 
42. See Albuja & Adarve, supra note 40, at 241 (arguing that disaster relief policy "should 
be guided by human rights standards"); see also id. at 243-44 (citing a UN Report that identified 
a human rights obligation to prevent and mitigate "the effects of disasters"). 
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needed because we can no longer afford to simply build and rebuild 
in a continuing cycle of destruction. 
II. SYMBOLIC OBSTACLES 
The language used to describe natural disasters shapes cultural 
understanding of those events and affects response. Take this remark 
Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin made after he travelled the state 
taking stock of the damage from Hurricane Irene: "I kind of felt like I 
was coming out of a war zone."43 Or this description of New York 
City in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy by Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg: "To describe it as looking like pictures we have seen at 
the end of World War II is not overstating it."44 Describing the sites 
of natural disasters as war zones is commonplace, 45 and this imagery 
taps into a prevailing cultural framework that posits natural disaster 
as an armed assault by nature on society. Couching disaster in these 
terms infuses disaster response with powerful symbolism. 
Rebuilding in the wake of disaster becomes an imperative. To do 
otherwise would be to concede defeat. 46 
There are obvious similarities between war and natural 
disaster-conditions in Vermont following Hurricane Irene did 
resemble those found in a war zone.47 Flooding had caused 
widespread damage to public infrastructure, houses, and 
businesses.48 The governor and other government officials toured 
the state by helicopter because travel over land was impossible in 
43. Terri Hallenbeck, The Chief Cheerleader, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Dec. 27, 2011, at 1A. 
44. James Barron, After the Devastation, a Daunting Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 30, 2012) 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 12/1 0/31/us/hurricane-sandy-barrels-region-leaving-battered-
path.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O; see also Irving Dejohn, Stormy Year: Hurricane Sandy was the 
Bora's Top Story in 2012, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 27, 2012, at 33 ("Superstorm Sandy 
swept through the city on October 29, with parts of southern Queens resembling post-
apocalyptic war zones for the weeks that followed."). 
45. See, e.g., Calvin Adkins, Town Un-Common, DAILY SOUTHERNER (Tarboro, N.C.), Aug. 
31, 2011, available at http:!!dailysouthemer.com!x803539061/TOWN-UN-COMMON (stating that the 
site of the hurricane "looked like a war zone"); Deadly joplin Tornado Was One Year Ago, 
MILWAUKEE]. SENTINEL, May 22, 2012, at C8 (describing site of Tornado as "a bombed-out city 
in a war zone"); Ron Scherer, After the Snowstorm: Power Outages Mean No Heat, No Trick-or- Treating, 
CHRISTIAN Scr. MONITOR, Oct. 31,2011 (stating that site of blizzard "resembles a war zone"). 
46. Although the armed conflict paradigm dominates discourse about disaster, natural 
disasters directly affect many more people each year. See Mauch, supra note 13, at 2 (citing UN 
statistics). 
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some areas, and thousands of members of the National Guard, 
dressed in camouflage and operating military vehicles, descended on 
the state to aid with response. 49 
However, only certain aspects of natural disasters resemble war. 
Nature does not attack strategically or with malice like human foes, 
and responsibility for the damage caused by natural events lies in no 
small part with individuals that build in areas subject to natural 
hazards and the policymakers that facilitate this activity.50 This 
section, therefore, explores the ways that reliance on the metaphor 
of war may trigger a maladaptive response to natural disaster. 
Metaphor plays an important part in framing social understanding 
of events that transpire in the world and can play a particularly 
important role in shaping popular understanding of difficult -to-
conceptualize scientific concepts. 51 The philosopher Kenneth Burke 
defines metaphor as "a device for seeing something in terms of 
something else."52 Metaphor, then, enables transference of 
understanding and insight from one conceptual arena to another, but at 
the same time, metaphor can lead to distortion. In the context of 
natural disaster, the metaphor of armed conflict holds powerful allure 
because of the social resonance of war and because the metaphor 
accords with cultural mythology that identifies nature as the perpetrator 
when natural disaster occurs. Seen through the lens of war, domestic 
natural disasters become an attack on the American homeland. It is no 
coincidence, perhaps, that the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
charged with managing the federal response to natural disasters, is 
housed within the Department ofHomeland Security. 53 
49. Id. 
50. As Professor Richard Lazarus put it, "Mother Nature is not humankind's enemy. Nor 
is Mother Nature invariability our friend. . . . Mother Nature simply 'is.'" Lazarus, supra note 
41, at 1021. 
51. Kathleen Tierney et al., Metaphors Matter: Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their 
Consequences in Hurricane Katrina, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. SCI. 57, 74-76 (2006); Esa 
Valiverronen, Biodiversity and the Power of Metaphor in Environmental Discourse, 11 Sci. STUDIES 19, 
19 (1998). 
52. KENNETH BURKE, ON SYMBOLS AND SOCIETY 247 (1989). 
53. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-09-25, FEMA: IN OR 
OuT?, 6-7 (2009). Donald Ketti has insightfully examined the merging of FEMA into the 
Department of Homeland Security explaining that reorganizing the federal bureaucracy in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina gave politicians the chance to "declare victory as soon as the ink of 
the president's signature is dry." Donald F. Ketti, Is the Worst Yet to Come?, 604 ANNALS AM. 
225 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
I am not the first to suggest that language and mythology shape 
perceptions of disaster policy. Frederick Bates and Walter Peacock 
have argued, for example, that using the single term "disaster" to 
describe tragic events across multiple scales-personal, familial, 
neighborhood-level, and societal-confuses analysis and 
understanding of these phenomena, which often have little in 
common other than the human suffering involved. 54 By extension, 
Bates and Peacock's analysis may suggest that identifying natural 
events, terrorist attacks, and large-scale accidents as "disasters," as is 
commonly done, 55 may imply a false equivalency between the causes 
of these events. 
Lisa Grow Sun has examined the effect that mythology about 
natural disaster has on short-term government response.56 Professor 
Sun's analysis focuses on a commonly held belief that disaster breeds 
civil disorder, and she argues that media outlets play a central role in 
perpetuating that belief even in the face of contrary evidence. 57 As 
she explains, this error in understanding the natural disaster 
narrative has "important implications for disaster law and policy," 
leading government to overemrhasize law enforcement at the 
expense of humanitarian efforts.5 This Article's aim is to examine a 
related aspect of modern understandings of natural disaster that-
either explicitly or implicitly-cast disaster as a conflict between 
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 273, 278 (2006). 
54. See Frederick L. Bates & Walter G. Peacock, Disaster and Social Change, in SOCIOLOGY OF 
DISASTERS: CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGY TO DISASTER RESEARCH 291, 291-92 (Russell R. Dynes 
eta!. eds., 1987). 
55. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 17, at 1; Ketti, supra note 53, at 276 
("Why did [we] fail to learn from September 11-and why are we likely to fail to learn yet again 
from Katrina?"). At one time, scholars of disaster suggested distinguishing between natural 
disasters and technological disasters but the distinction has not gained traction. See Quarantelli 
eta!., supra note 6, at 22. Grouping "disasters" intentionally caused by human agents with those 
resulting from natural events reinforces the armed conflict metaphor. In the rubric of disaster, 
terrorism and hurricane are equivalent. The intuition that society should respond to each in 
similar fashion is an unintended consequence of this equivalency. 
56. Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131 (2011) 
[hereinafter Sun, Disaster Mythology]. 
57. Id. at 1135-36. 
58. Id. In related work, Professor Sun and Professor RonNell Anderson Jones examine the 
way that blending discourse about natural disasters with that related to war and terrorism 
results in government policies and practices that restrict the flow of information and limit 
transparency. See Lisa Grow Sun & RonNell Anderson Jones, Disaggregating Disasters, UCLA L. 
REV. at 2 (forthcoming). 
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humans and nature in which nature is inevitably viewed as the 
aggressor. 
The metaphor of natural disaster as conflict resonates with 
significant cultural history. The story of the great flood, for example, 
features prominently in many religions. In the Judea-Christian 
tradition, the flood constitutes a manifestation of divine will sent to 
scour the world of sin. 59 Importantly, historical views on natural 
disasters equivocated as to whether they were agents of good or evil. 
Take for example, alternate explanations of earthquakes in fifteenth-
century Egypt. Prominent Islamic intellectuals of the time recognized 
two possible explanations for earthquakes. At times, earthquakes, 
just as the great flood of the Bible, were viewed as a divine act 
necessary to punish a sinful world. 60 At other times, earthquakes 
were attributed to evil.61 According to belief, the world balanced on 
a large fish. 62 The devil would, on occasion, flatter the fish and it 
would swell up with pride, shaking the world. 63 God would calm the 
fish, restoring order. 64 Parallel understandings of natural disaster 
have long been a feature of the Judea-Christian tradition, including a 
view of natural disaster generally as divine retribution or the work of 
infernal forces. 65 
Natural disasters continue to be described in language that 
hearkens back to this religious history. For example, the phrase "act 
of God" is routinely used in the law to describe natural disaster. 66 
59. See, e.g., Russell R. Dynes, Noah and Disaster Planning: The Cultural Significance of the Flood 
Story, 11 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 170, 171 (2003). 
60. Anna Akasoy, Islamic Attitudes to Disasters in the Middle Ages: A Comparison of Earthquakes 
and Plagues, 10 MEDIEVALHIST.J. 387, 392 (2007). 
61. I d. at 3 90-91. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See, e.g., David K. Chester & Angus M. Duncan, Responding to Disasters Within the 
Christian Tradition, With Reference to Volcanic Eruptions and Earthquakes, 40 RELIGION 85, 86-87 
(2010). 
66. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (2006) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (Clean Water Act); 15 U.S.C. § 
1693h (Consumer Credit Protection Act); 19 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006) (Tariff Act of 1930). 
Reinforcing the connection between divine interpretations of natural disasters and armed 
conflict, federal statutes often address acts of God and acts of war together. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 
19jj-1 (2006) (limiting liability of individuals damaging national parks where the damage "was 
caused solely by an act of God or an act of war); 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (limiting oil-pollution 
liability if caused by an act of God or an act of war). 
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Despite the reference to God, however, secular understandings of 
natural disaster dominate the contemporary discourse in the United 
States. As Ted Steinberg has richly detailed, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, religious understandings of natural disasters had 
fallen out of favor with the nation's elite, in no small part because 
such a perspective was viewed as undermining economic recovery. 67 
Steinberg suggests that natural disasters were rewritten, drained of 
moral meaning, and dressed up in the clothing of nature, rather than 
supernatural forces. 68 But this transformation did not fully embrace 
scientific conceptions of natural events. Rather, powerful economic 
and social forces mobilized to downplay the importance of disasters, 
including dishonest reporters influenced by financers with stakes in 
perpetuating booming development downplaying the effects of 
natural hazards. 69 Following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, for 
example, reporters recast the event as an out-of-control fire, 
transforming a disaster arising out of the geological setting of the 
city into one that could occur anywhere. 70 Similar efforts to 
deemphasize natural disaster followed the 1926 hurricane that 
struck Miami. The editor of the Miami Herald purportedly directed 
his staff to divide damage assessments by ten in their reporting to 
minimize concern about the dangers of living in the hurricane-prone 
city. 71 Steinberg describes these efforts and many more as the 
"politics of forgetfulness," whereby economic and political leaders 
systematically attempted to distract from natural disaster to facilitate 
development in hazard-prone areas.72 
Steinberg captures a sensibility that dominated much of the 
twentieth century. Projecting safety and calm in the wake of disaster 
allowed cities to continue with rapid development, and, indeed, the 
desire to minimize the effects of disaster was so great that cities 
would turn down offers of financial assistance. 73 Recent decades, 
however, have witnessed a return to sensationalized accounts of 
67. See TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD 5-22 (2000) (compiling historical documents related 
to the Charleston earthquake of 1886 to demonstrate shift from religious to secular view of 
disaster). 
68. See id. at 4. 
69. See id. at 33-46. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 55. 
72. See id. at 201. 
73. See id. at 58-59 (turning down assistance from the Red Cross). 
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natural disasters, 74 perhaps as a result of increasingly available 
information, which has made concealing natural hazards difficult, 75 
and a belief that the federal treasury provides a seemingly 
inexhaustible supply of recovery dollars. 76 
The contemporary incarnation of the disaster narrative continues 
to be predominantly secular.l7 That is not to say that the religious 
narrative has died out altogether. A 2011 survey conducted by the 
Public Religion Research Institute found that a significant minority 
of Americans believe that natural disasters are of divine origin. 78 The 
majority of Americans, however, view disasters as natural events. 79 
74. See, e.g., supra note 45. 
75. Cf LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 10 (2001) (Discussing the potential of the 
Internet to enhance human interaction and information sharing). As David Ropeik noted in the 
wake of Superstorm Sandy, "[E]ven if you can avoid the traditional news, it's hard to escape the 
social 'news' from the virtual world to which we are so connected. The flood of tweets and 
Facebook posts about the storm further magnified the fear." David Ropeik, Superstorm Sandy 
Reminds Us Why It's Easy to Underestimate Danger, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http:/ /articles. washingtonpost.com/2012-11-02/opinions/35503963 _1_ natural-disasters-
generators-chris-christie. 
76. See David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 
1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 307, 309-10 (Kenneth A. Froot, ed., 1999); see also 
id. at 318 (describing "disaster relief' as looking "very much like an entitlement"). The federal 
government's extensive expenditures on disaster relief likely fuel this belief. Between 2004 and 
2011, the federal disaster relief fund, through which the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration provides recovery assistance to state and local governments, spent an average of 
approximately $10 billion a year. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE: IMPROVED CRITERIA NEEDED TO ASSESS A jURISDICTION'S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND AND 
RECOVER ON ITS OWN 2, 14 (2012), available at http:/ /gao.gov/assets/650/648162.pdf. 
77. The transformation from divine to scientific understandings of disaster is often traced 
to the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. See FARBER, ET AL, supra note 12, at 1; David K. Chester & 
Angus M. Duncan, Responding to Disasters Within the Christian Tradition with Reference to Volcanic 
Eruptions and Earthquakes, 40 RELIGION 85, 86 (2010). See generally john R. Mullin, The 
Reconstruction of Lisbon Following the Earthquake of 1755: A Study in Despotic Planning, 7 PLANNING 
PERSPECTIVES 157 (1992) (discussing the earthquake and the reconstruction of Lisbon). As 
Chester and Angus note, in many modern societies, including in the United States, religious and 
scientific narratives often coexist. See Chester & Duncan, supra, at 89-90. 
78. Few Americans See Earthquakes, Floods, and Other Natural Disasters a Sign from God, PuB. 
RELIGION RES. !NST. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://publicreligion.org/research/ 2011/03/few-americans-
see-earthquakes-floods-and-other-natural-disasters-a-sign-from-god-2/. Religious leaders have 
also largely embraced understandings of disasters that find human activities significantly 
culpable for loss. A 2000 study of Christian clergy in South Carolina reported similar results, 
including, strikingly, that more than seventy-five percent of clergy indicated that most humans 
have a significant ability to prevent losses in the face of natural disasters. See jerry T. Mitchell, 
The Hazards of One's Faith: Hazard Perceptions of South Carolina Christina Clergy, 2 ENVTL. HAZARDS 
25, 34 (2000). 
79. Dispute over ascribing natural disaster to divine source broke out in the government 
of Arkansas in 1997, with Governor and Baptist minister Mike Huckabee declaring that he 
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Nonetheless, disasters are often described as "acts of nature" rather 
than occurrences, according agency to natural forces and maintaining 
the sense, even if not specifically voiced, that nature and humans are 
involved in a conflict in which nature is an enemy that must be 
resisted. 
This cultural approach to disaster is reflected in and reinforced 
by the mass media's approach to natural disaster, which relies 
routinely on the metaphor of armed conflict as a source of evocative 
language and catchy headlines.80 Powerful storms "assault" and 
"attack."81 Nature acts with violence, 82 terrorizing, 83 and wreaking 
havoc on the human world, 84 leaving in its wake areas resembling a 
"post-apocalyptic warzone"85 or "looking like they ha[ve] been hit by 
a bomb."86 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was 
consistently described by on-the-ground observers as a "war zone." 87 
In this war metaphor, nature is personified and made the enemy. 
would not sign a disaster-assistance bill if it described tornadoes as "acts of God." See Mitchell, 
supra note 78, at 25. 
80. Quarantelli, supra note 6, at 31 (explaining that "the mass communication system is 
by far the major source of 'information' about a disaster or a crisis" and that" [i]n major ways, it 
socially constructs disasters and crises"). 
81. Seth Borenstein, et a!., Powerful Andrew Launches Assault on Louisiana's Coast, SOUTH 
FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 1992, at A1; Cain Burdeau & Michael Kunzelman, Gulf Coast 
Takes Beating from Slow-Moving Isaac, DENVER POST, Aug. 30, 2012, at 19A; Dennis Cauchon, eta!., 
Big Deals of 13: Problems We Welcome and Those We'd Rather Leave Behind, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 2012, 
at 1A; Joshua Schneyer & Selam Gebrekidan, Insight: Sandy Gives New York Oil Supply Lesson, 
REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2012; Kelly Yamanouchi, Gas Prices; Storm Plays Role as Fuel Costs Rise, ATLANTA 
jOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 30, 2012, at 1A. 
82. See Linda Barron, Together Through Any Storm, BEAUREGARD DAILY NEWS, Jun. 16, 2012, 
at 1; Mark Williams, Utilities No Match for Hurricanes, PRESS-REGISTER, Jan. 7, 2009, at F3. 
83. C. Clark Hubbard, The New Year, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, Dec. 20, 2012; Hurricane 
Andrew, A 'Modern-Day Apocalypse', SOUTH FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (1992), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/news/local/southflorida/sfl-1992-hurricane,O, 7825579 .story (last visited Sept. 11, 
2012); Beth Kassab, Any Economic Bump Could Be Blown Away, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 19, 2008, 
at C1; Anthony R. Wood, Weather or Not: A History-Making Hurricane Year (Yes, This One), PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Sept. 10, 2007, at Dl. 
84. Andrew Wreaks Havoc inS. Florida; Cost in Billions, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug 25, 1992, 
at Al; james Quirk, eta!., Flood Victims Fed Up, N.J. RECORD, Oct. 9, 2011, at Al. 
85. Action News at 11 (ABC television broadcast Dec. l, 2011), 2011 WLNR 25025533. 
86. Hurricane Andrew (1992), S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (1992), http:/ /www.sun-
sentinel.com/topic/disasters-accidents/meteorological-disasters/hurricanes/hurricane-andrew-
(l992)-EVHST000062.topic (last visited jan. 22, 2013). 
87. See Tierney, supra note 51, at 71. The war-zone is a common metaphor for the site of 
natural disaster. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, the damage done to human development by natural events is 
an expression of nature's "fury" or "capricious wrath."88 
Similar narratives of the almost-intelligent malevolence of nature 
play themselves out in popular culture, particularly through disaster 
movies like Dante's Peak, Twister, and The Day After Tomorrow. Indeed, 
the history of the disaster-film genre suggests that the narrative 
parallels it exhibits with war movies are hardly coincidental, but 
rather, depiction of human versus nature grew up as "a generic 
surrogate for war films" at a time when public popularity of imagery 
associated with the Vietnam War declined. 89 
The narrative of armed conflict has become even more resonant 
in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Indeed, 9/11 has become 
something of a benchmark against which other disasters are 
measured. Consider, for example, a column by New York Times 
columnist Paul Krugman explaining that "the failed response to 
Katrina shows that we are less ready to cope with a terrorist attack 
today than we were four years ago."90 Or this, by columnist Frank 
Rich: 
[W]e cannot allow ourselves to forget the real history 
surrounding 9/ll; it is the Rosetta stone for what is 
happening now. If we are to pull ourselves out of the 
disasters of Katrina and Iraq alike, we must live in the real 
world, not the fantasyland of the administration's faith-
based propaganda.91 
88. See, e.g., Steve Alexander, Simulating Nature's Wrath, When It Comes to Calculating 
Disasters, Computer Simulations Aim to Measure the "Possible Risk of Ruin", STAR TRIBUNE, jul. 8, 2012, 
at 03; joe Bastardi, Natural Cycles Trigger Extremes, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2012, at A6; Heather 
Lake, Preparing for the Worst: Windham Eyes Emergency Micro-Grid Program, CHRONICLE (Williamatic, 
Conn.), May 21, 2012, at 1. 
89. Mauch, supra note 13, at 2. 
90. Paul Krugman, Killed by Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A21. To give Krugman 
his due, after setting up an equivalency between 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, Krugman does 
note the crucial difference, stating that "disasters must be coped with, even if they aren't caused 
by evildoers. Now we have another deadly lesson in why we need an effective government, and 
why dedicated public servants deserve our respect. Will we listen?" Id. 
91. Frank Rich, Falluja Floods the Superdome, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, Section 4 at 10; see 
also Jamie Do ward, et a!., Aftermath of the Hurricane: America's Ordeal, OBSERVER (London), Sept. 4, 
2005, at 15 ("[T]he disaster in New Orleans coming a week ahead of the fourth anniversary of 
9/11, has a far wider national meaning than simply the Katrina catastrophe itself. Crucially it 
calls into doubt Bush's electoral promise that he was the best candidate to protect the nation 
from a terrorist attack."). 
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A newspaper article running in the Chicago Tribune explained 
that "even if the death toll from Katrina exceeds the roughly 3,000 
fatalities from the 9/11 attacks, the obvious difference, initially, was 
how frightenin~ and ominous 9/11 felt from border to border and 
coast to coast." 2 Alternatively, consider this article in the New York 
Times describing sympathy expressed by those who lost a loved one 
in 9/11 for the victims of Hurricane Katrina: 
There is suffering, and there is suffering. There is private 
pain, and then there is the sort of pain that suddenly goes 
public, that is broadcast to the nation .... It's a select 
group. The 9/11 families belong to it, of course, as do 
those who lost a loved one in the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing. Now the victims of Katrina, too, belong. 93 
A column in the Savannah Morning News following Superstorm 
Sandy sums up the sentiment, explaining that "Mother Nature can 
be a terrorist like no other."94 
The power of the conflict imagery has not been lost on advocacy 
groups. For example, an advertisement advocating for creation of a 
federal insurance program for wind insurance read: "How do you 
deal with an enemy that has no government, no money trail and no 
qualms about killing women and children? The enemy is Mother 
Nature."95 This advertisement primes associations between natural 
disaster and armed conflict, evoking events like war and terrorism, 
with the obvious purpose of triggering a social response of resistance 
to enemy incursion. Military advertising may further strengthen 
these associations. National Guard recruitment efforts often mix 
images of disaster response with images of armed conflict.96 
92. Eric Zorn, Katrina Shows We're Not Ready for Catastrophe, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2005, at 
Metro 1; see also id. ("At first, the comparisons some drew between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 
the devastation left behind by Hurricane Katrina seemed glib and shallow."). 
93. Alan Feuer, A Fellowship of Suffering, Ever Expanding, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2005), 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/nyregion/thecity/04cope.html? _r=O (acknowledging the 
connection publicly perceived between 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, saying "the public often 
says: Don't forget. Don't forget the towers falling down. Don't forget the levees breaking open," 
and concludes that "New Orleans, like New York, will rise again"). 
94. Hubbard, supra note 83. 
95. Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, at All. 
96. See, e.g., National Guard, At This Moment, YouTUBE (Nov. 12, 2009), 
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Political leaders draw on this language too. Consider this 
statement by the mayor of Atlantic City following Superstorm Sandy: 
"When Mother Nature sends her wrath your way, we're at her 
mercy."97 Or these statements made by President Barack Obama and 
Mayor of New Orleans Mitch Landrieu in the hours before Hurricane 
Isaac made landfall in Louisiana in August 2012. Mayor Landrieu 
expressed the urgency of the situation by explaining, "We are officially 
into the fight, and the city of New Orleans is now on the front 
lines."98 However, New Orleans was prepared. "We are battle-ready," 
reported the Mayor. 99 President Obama used similar language of 
conflict to invoke national unity, stating, "[W]hen disaster strikes, 
we're not Democrats or Republicans first, we are Americans first." 100 
Similar rhetoric was used in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Testifying 
before the U.S. House of Representatives, Louisiana Governor 
Kathleen Blanco explicitly invoked feelings of patriotism tied up in 
armed conflict in discussing Hurricane Katrina: "After World War II 
our decision to rebuild Europe was farsighted and courageous. History 
will treat us well if we exhibit the same kind of political courage 
now." 101 And in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, a local government 
official in Florida posed the question as television cameras rolled: 
"Where in the hell is the cavalry?" 102 
http:/ /www.youtube.com/watch?v=AbfpjOOpTNY; 3 Doors Down, Citizen Soldier, YouTuBE 
(Nov. 23, 2007), http:/ /www.youtube.com/watch?v=emm4VFvn2jg. 
97. jacque Wilson, Victims Fall to Superstorm's Wrath, CNN (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://www .cnn.com/20 12/1 0/31/us/ superstorm-sandy-victi ms-profiles/index.html. 
98. John Schwartz & Campbell Robertson, Hurricane Isaac Makes Landfall Along Gulf Coast, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/us/tropical-storm-isaac-on-
verge-of-becoming-a-category-1-hurricane.html?pagewanted =all. 
99. Molly Hennessy-Piske & David Zucchino, Nervous Gulf Residents Brace for Gathering 
Storm, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2012, at A7. 
100. Schwartz & Robertson, supra note 98. President Obama offered similar comments in 
the wake of Superstorm Sandy: "[W]hen disaster strikes, we see America at its best." Mary 
Bruce, Obama Invokes Superstorm Sandy on the Campaign Trail, ABC NEWS (Nov. l, 2012), 
http:/ I abcnews.go.com/blogs/poli tics/20 12/1 1 I obama -invokes-s u perstorm-sandy-on-the-
campaign-trail/. 
I 01. Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana: Hearing Before the 
Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, I 09th Cong. 
2 (2005) (statement of Governor Kathleen Blanco). 
I 02. Wayne Washington, Can FEMA Handle S.C. Hurricane? Candidates Vary on if Agency Should 
Stay Part of Homeland Security, CoLUMBIA ST. (S.C.), Aug. 26, 2007, at B9. Describing those 
assisting with disaster response as the cavalry, even if they have no relationship to the military, 
is not uncommon. See Steffani Nolte, Progress Energy Crews Restore Power to North Carolina, 
FLORENCE MORNING NEWS (S.C.), Aug. 29, 2011. 
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The metaphor of natural event as attack is reinforced by the fact 
that the domestic response to natural disaster closely parallels 
responses to military action. Waiting for the "cavalry" evokes images 
of battlefields and weary soldiers desperate for reinforcements. 
Moreover, in the wake of natural disaster, local communities actually 
await aid from the military. For example, members of the New York 
National Guard's 101st Cavalry were activated to assist areas 
damaged by Superstorm Sandy. 103 Thus, victims of Superstorm 
Sandy were, quite literally, waiting for the "cavalry." The military 
also has a prominent role in engineering efforts to stave off disaster. 
The Army Corps of Engineers is primarily charged with construction 
and maintenance of structural defenses to natural hazards. 104 And 
emergency management agencies evolved out of civilian defense 
groups designed to address threats of air raid during times of armed 
conflict. 105 The vivid image of military convoys rushing to disaster 
sites only reinforces the sense that we are, indeed, at war with 
nature. 106 
All of this talk of war, assault, and attack perpetuates 
vulnerability to natural hazards by framing reconstruction as 
necessary. In the aftermath of 9/11, the phrase "these colors don't 
run" became a popular means of communicating America's 
resolve. 107 Retaliation and reconstruction were seen as the only 
available response to the terrorist attacks, else the terrorists would 
have secured a victory over the American psyche. Natural disasters 
trigger a similar response, a "knee-jerk reaction . . . to rebuild the 
same roads and bridges that existed before and bigger, more 
expensive homes." 108 Where a foreign agent-be it a foreign power 
103. Richard Goldenberg, N.Y Mobilizes More than 2,300 Guardsmen to Battle Hurricane Sandy 
Aftermath, DEF. DEP'T DOCUMENTS, Oct. 3, 2012. National Guard units from other states were 
also deployed to respond to Superstorm Sandy. See National Guard Soldiers Activated for Sandy, 
ARMY TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012), http:/ /www.armytimes.com/news/2012/10/ap-national-guard-
activates-750-in-pa-for-sandy-102912/ (noting that Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia 
activated more than 3,000 national guard soldiers to respond to Superstorm Sandy). 
104. See, e.g., About Us, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, http:/ /www.usace.army.mil/ 
About.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
105. Quarantelli eta!., supra note 6, at 20. 
106. See, e.g., Sun, Disaster Mythology, supra note 56, at 1133 (quoting CNN's Wolf Blitzer as 
describing the arrival of National Guard troops in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina as 
"eight convoys and troops are on the ground at last in a place being described as a lawless, 
deadly war zone"). 
107. See Old Glory Gave Comfort to a Wounded Nation, Often Waved in Dissent or Disagreement, It 
Gave Us Unity After Attacks, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Sept. 11, 2011, at A16 
108. Kate Spinner, Girding Nation for Weather Extremes, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, 
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or an overly proud fish-causes harm to the homeland, we respond 
using a militaristic frame in which we must defend ourselves and 
ultimately defeat the other. Such responses may be appropriate in 
the case of terrorist attack or armed conflict, but they have no value 
in the face of hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes that pay no 
mind to society's actions. 109 Natural events do not intend to cause 
destruction and terror. Proudly demonstrating a commitment to 
rebuild in the same hazard-prone locations will not deter future 
events. The rhetoric of conflict forecloses, or at least renders more 
difficult, decisions to rebuild in more sensible, safer locations 
because, in the narrative of armed conflict, such response represents 
capitulation and retreat. 110 
Ill. COGNITIVE OBSTACLES 
The symbolic obstacles to reform discussed in the previous Part 
synergize with aspects of human co?nition that systematically skew 
public perception of disaster risk. 11 Even when science provides a 
Fla.), Jan. 27, 2012, at Bl. Notably, that "communities, by and large ... assume that they will 
rebuild after disasters is a relatively recent development." james K. Mitchell, American Disasters 
During the Twentieth Century: The Case of New jersey, in NATURAL DISASTERS, CULTURAL RESPONSES, 
supra note 12, at 327, 337. In a detailed account of disaster history in New jersey-a state that 
we rarely associate with natural disasters-Mitchell explains that numerous small communities 
along the New jersey Coast and located in the fire-prone pine barrens have been abandoned. 
Only in the last few decades have we become so enamored of structural approaches to disaster 
mitigation that a presumption of reconstruction has arisen. !d. at 336-37. 
109. Similarly, Professors Sun and Jones explain that restricting information may be 
appropriate in some circumstances during wartime to prevent thinking enemies from exploiting 
that information to the detriment of national security. See Sun & jones, supra note 58, at 15. But 
this justification does not apply to natural disasters. Id. at 49. 
110. Indeed, discussion of necessary migration of development away from coastlines to 
reduce vulnerability to hurricanes and rising sea levels is typically phrased in terms of retreat. 
See, e.g.,]. Peter Byrne & jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAw OF ADAPTATION TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 267 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). The very concept 
of "recovery" as generally used today reinforces the notion that in the aftermath of disaster, the 
only appropriate response is to rebuild. Take for example a relatively technical definition of 
recovery provided in the sociological literature. Recovery is defined as "a community reaching 
that point in its social and economic development that it would have reached had no disaster 
occurred." Bates & Peacock, supra note 54, at 302; see also id. at 326 (explaining that most 
disaster assistance in the United States "has the aim of restoring the system to its former 
condition"). However, so defining recovery stacks the deck. It means that we can only recover by 
rebuilding. Recovery, under that definition, does not include decisions not to rebuild but rather 
to integrate affected communities into others in less hazard-prone areas. 
111. This section focuses on the ways that cognition skews perceptions of probabilities 
that risks will manifest. It does not, therefore, address cognitive processes that favor instant 
gratification over longer-term benefits. See Lazarus, supra note 41, at 1035 ("Human beings 
naturally discount the temporally and physically distant because of the apparent lack of direct 
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reasonably certain prediction about the likelihood of disaster, the 
human brain may unreasonably discount that risk. The perception 
that reconstruction isn't risky reinforces the intuition that rebuilding 
is a symbolic necessity. This Part explores cognitive errors that may 
skew perceptions of natural hazards and thereby directly affect not 
only policymakers' interest in reducing vulnerability but also the 
public demand for such action. 
In recent decades, psychologists have uncovered numerous ways 
that cognition leads to seemingly irrational decision making. 112 
Processes of so-called "bounded rationality" lead to systematic skew 
in thinking that can have profound implications for law. 113 The 
human brain has trouble conceptualizing probabilistic events, 
particularly those with low frequency and high severity. 114 This 
problem becomes extreme as probabilities approach zero. As a form 
of mental shortcut, in some circumstances the mind perceives very 
low probabilities as impossibilities. So, for example, scholars 
investigating insurance markets have suggested that this mental 
shortcut may account for widespread underinvestment in insurance 
to protect against very-low-probability events, particularly natural 
disasters. 115 Similarly, viewing low risks as zero risks may lead 
relevancy to their own lives."). I do not mean to suggest, however, that public perceptions of 
risk are unimportant to public policy. Risk perception may be "irrationally" skewed by 
discounting. See id. It may also be more responsive to those effects of disaster that are hard to 
quantify, such as psychological responses of victims or even those physically unaffected. As Paul 
Slavic explained, "'riskiness' means more to people than 'expected number of fatalities."' Paul 
Slavic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 285 (1987). But see Frank B. Cross, Facts and Values in 
Risk Assessment, 59 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYS. SAFETY 27, 27 (1998) (arguing that "the 
public's risk perception is pervasively infected by ignorance or illegitimate value judgments"). 
Scientific estimates of the probabilities of floods, blizzards, earthquakes and the like are also 
subject to a degree of social construction because, in most cases, the data require interpretation. 
See Tom Horlick-jones, Meaning and Contextualization in Risk Assessment, 59 ENGINEERING & SYS. 
SAFETY 79, 81 (1998). But in the context of natural disasters at least, predictions about 
periodicity have a real-world check because, over time, a certain number of disasters will strike 
any particular area. This Part addresses the cognitive obstacles to accurately comprehending the 
likelihood of natural disasters. 
I 12. For general treatments of the psychology of bounded rationality, see HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE jUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovch et a!. eds., 2002); jUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman eta!. eds., l 982). 
I 13. See Christine jolls eta!., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
147I, 1477-78 (1998); see also john Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 j. ECON. LiTERATURE 
669, 669-70 (1996). 
114. See, e.g., Christine jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 ]. LEGAL STUD. 
199, 208-09 (2006). 
I IS. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 22, at 1 I; Howard Kunreuther eta!., Making 
Low Probabilities Useful, 23 ]. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 103 (2001); Paul Slavic et a!., Preference for 
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individuals to make economically irrational decisions about where 
and how to build. 
Consider how this cognitive error could affect someone owning 
property in a five-hundred-year flood plain. Such a risk might be 
sufficiently low that decisions about development will be made with 
no thought to flood risk, even if construction is economically 
marginal and would not be cost justified if the risk of loss were taken 
into account. This error also may infect government decisions, which 
are often made with little consideration for low likelihood events. 
Flood-control dams are rarely built to withstand five-hundred-year 
flood events and the NFIP does not include any minimum design 
standards for buildings subject to such risks. 116 In some 
circumstances, of course, these decisions are economically rational 
based on the risks, but in others, risks may simply be neglected. This 
is true despite the fact that a flood that occurs on average every 500 
years has a one percent chance to occur every five years, and a ten 
percent chance to occur every fifty years. And such floods have 
produced significant damage, as the residents of Duluth, Minnesota, 
discovered in June of 2012, where a five-hundred-year flood caused 
more than $100 million in damage. 117 Because individuals and 
policymakers perceive risks likely to actualize an average of once 
every five hundred years as risk-free, they may overlook cost-justified 
mitigation efforts. 
Other cognitive processes distort perceptions of natural hazards 
even when they are perceived. These rare events may be subject to 
two competing cognitive errors that lead to systematic devaluation of 
risk. The first, the gambler's fallacy, biases estimation of risks in the 
immediate aftermath of disaster. The gambler's fallacy causes people 
to believe that an unlikely event that has recently occurred is less 
Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS., 237, 254-55 (1977). 
But see Susan K. Laury et al., Insurance Decisions for Low-Probability Losses, 39]. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
17 (2009) (presenting data from an experiment indicating that "individuals are more likely to 
purchase insurance for the higher-consequence, lower-probability events"). 
116. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,988, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,951 § 6(b) (May 24, 1977) (defining 
"base flood" for purposes of NFIP as a "flood which has a one percent or greater chance of 
occurrence in any given year"); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-!25, MIDWEST 
FLOOD: INFORMATION ON THE PERFORMANCE, EFFECTS, AND CONTROL OF LEVEES 2-3 (!995) 
(noting that a "typical" federal flood control levee protects against a "100-year flood," while non-
federal levees often provide lesser protection). 
117. See Jennifer Brooks, Special Session Set for August on Flood Relief, STAR TRIB. (Minn.) Quly 
12, 20 12), http:/ /www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/16214 7585.html?refer=y. 
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likely to recur in the near future. 118 The gambler's fallacy is basically 
the belief that lightning doesn't strike the same place twice. 119 The 
gambler's fallacy, then, leads individuals and government entities to 
overinvest in reconstruction in the wake of disaster based on a 
mistaken assumption that a period of repose and relative safety will 
follow. 
Interviews with those struck by multiple disasters bear out the 
operation of the gambler's fallacy. In upstate New York, a business 
executive for a company that had built a large commercial facility in 
a floodplain damaged in Hurricane Irene explained that since 
flooding had recently occurred, "[w]e thought we had a hundred 
years." 120 Similarly, a Louisiana property owner explained his 
decision to rebuild saying "something like [Hurricane] Katrina 
happens only once in a hundred years. . . . By that time, I'll be 
dead." 121 As a Florida resident explained, "I never had a problem. 
Then came [a hurricane]. Afterward, I said it wouldn't happen 
twice." 122 Similarly, in repeated flooding of the Susquehanna River 
in 2006 and 2011, one local resident explained that he believed the 
2006 event had been a "once-in-a-lifetime flood" and another 
emphasized that "you don't expect it two times in five years." 123 
This type of thinking can lead people to invest heavily in the wake of 
disaster. 124 
118. See Stephen P. Stitch & Richard E. Nisbett, justification and the Psychology of Human 
Reasoning, 47 PHIL. Sci. 188, 192-93 (1980) (explaining the gambler's fallacy); see also Tristram 
McPherson, Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism, 3 ]. ETHICS & Soc. PHIL. 2, 20 (2009) 
("Ordinary reasoners display robust endorsement of irrational inference patterns such as the 
gambler's fallacy."). 
119. The idiom fails to even accurately describe the behavior of lightning. See MythBusters: 
Lightning Strikes Twice (Discovery Channel television broadcast Apr. 5, 2011), available at 
http:/ /dsc.discovery.com/tv-shows/mythbusters/videos/lightning-strikes-twice-minimyth.htm. 
120. Semple, supra note 31. 
121. Peter Whoriskey, New Orleans Repeats Mistakes as it Rebuilds: Many Houses Built in Areas 
Katrina Flooded Are Not on Raised Foundations, WASH. PosT Oan. 4, 2007), 
http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007 /01/03/ 
AR2007010301593.html. 
122. Tyler Bridges, Victims Are Stunned by Ferocity of Storm, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 6, 2000, at 
B2. 
123. Sarah Hofius Hall et a!., Flood Victims Recount Their Experiences, TIMES-TRIBUNE 
(Scranton, Pa.) (Sept. 10, 2011), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/flood-victims-recount-their-
experiences-1.1201023. 
124. For example, following 2006 flooding of a post office, a couple purchased the building 
to live in and invested substantial money and energy in custom design. The home was then 
destroyed in Hurricane Irene. See Josh Mrozinski, In Hard-Hit Neighborhoods, Rebuilding Begins, 
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The gambler's fallacy depresses estimation of risk in the 
immediate aftermath of disaster, but as time passes and memories of 
the aftermath fade, a second cognitive error may kick in and continue 
to skew risk perceptions. 125 Specifically, the availability heuristic 
may replace the gambler's fallacy, leading to a similar result. The 
availability heuristic leads people to assess the likelihood that 
something will occur based on the ease with which an example of it 
comes to mind. 126 Over time, the experience of disaster will come to 
mind less easily, leading to assumptions of relative safety and 
causing people to make decisions as though the natural hazards no 
longer existed. When disaster strikes again, people express surprise 
and shock at the ending of a long period of calm. 127 As an 
experienced insurance adjuster put it, "Wherever it's been a long 
time since the last hurricane ... people become complacent." 128 
Another version of the availability heuristic may also be at work. 
People typically believe that others make rational decisions, and 
observing others living and working in hazard-prone areas may lead 
to assumptions about safety. 129 In other words, observing others 
TIMES-TRIBUNE (Pa.) (Sept. 3, 2011), http:!/thetimes-tribune.com/news/in-hard-hit-
neighborhoods-rebuilding-begins-1.1197 435. 
125. The results of this cognitive error may vary between individuals. For some, the 
availability heuristic may drown out the gambler's fallacy, particularly where a natural disaster 
has had unusually powerful affects. Spikes in insurance purchasing in the wake of certain 
disasters suggest that particularly in the very short term, property owners may have heightened 
perceptions of risk. For example, between September 30, 2011 and August 31, 2012, the number 
of NFIP policies purchased in Vermont grew by about sixteen percent. See National Flood Insurance 
Program: Total Number of Policies in Force, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Mar. 2012), 
http:/ /www.fema.gov/policy-claim-statistics-flood-insurance/policy-claim-statistics-flood-
insurance/policy-claim-13-2 (follow "Total Number of Policies in Force" hyperlink) (identifying 
3,719 policies in Vermont as of September 30, 2011); National Flood Insurance Program: Policy 
Statistics, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1011.htm (last 
visited jan. 13, 2013) (identifying 4,327 policies in force as of August 31, 2012). As a result, 
"availability and salience [may] create short-term spikes in demand immediately after a horrific 
natural disaster, but, as the vividness of the event recedes, the gambler's fallacy kicks in to 
depress demand for insurance." See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 33 n. 123. 
126. See Christine Jolls et a!., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1477-78 (1998) (explaining the availability heuristic). 
127. Hurricane Irene was the worst storm in Vermont since 1927. See Matt Sutkoski, The 
Power of Water, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Sept. 4, 2011, at 01. Of course, it should come as no 
surprise that one-hundred-year flooding occurs twice in the span of ninety years. 
128. Susan R.A. Honeyman, When Uncommon Storms Make a Surprise Visit, ROUGH NOTES, 
May I, 2012, at 66, available at http://www.roughnotes.com/rnmagazine/2012/ 
may2012/2012_05p066.htm. 
129. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
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living and working in hazard-prone areas provides readily available 
examples that appear to suggest that risks are low. Similarly, people 
often overestimate the effectiveness of mitigation measures. 130 
Because cognition depends in part on observation of the behavior of 
others, cognitive errors can compound, causing whole communities 
to adopt false understandings of disaster risk based on assumptions 
about the beliefs of others. 131 
This dynamic can be particularly strong when public-works 
projects designed to reduce hazards are involved. 132 For example, 
people overestimate the protection afforded by dikes designed to 
protect against floods, and this is particularly so when others live 
and work in the shadow of those projects. This hard lesson has been 
taught repeatedly. The Central Valley of California is a particularly 
dramatic example. Before the construction of dams, the valley was 
subject to dramatic flooding. 133 After dams were constructed, 
residential and commercial development swiftly dominated the 
landscape to such an extent that "new homeowners have little 
notion that they live in a floodplain." 134 But dams can only contain 
so much water, and in 1997 more than 185 homes were flooded 
when the Tuolumne River jumped its heavily engineered banks. 135 
Hurricane Katrina also taught the lesson of engineering increasing 
vulnerability in even more dramatic fashion. 136 
L. REV. 683,710-12 (1999) (discussing social framing of risk perception). 
130. The National Hurricane Center, for example, instructs people not to tape their 
windows before a hurricane because it "leads to a false sense of security." Mike Schneider, Don't 
Tape Your Windows Before a Hurricane, Officials Say, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 28, 2012, at A3. As 
David Ropeik aptly described in the Washington Post following Superstorm Sandy, "The more 
control over a risk you think you have, the less worrisome it feels, no matter how false that 
sense of control might be." David Ropeik, Superstorm Sandy Reminds Us Why It's Easy to 
Underestimate Danger, WASH. PosT (Nov. 2, 2012), http:/ /articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-
02/ opinions/3 5503 963 _l_ natural-disasters-generators-chris-christie. 
131. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 129, at 711. 
132. Raymond Burby has termed this the "safe development paradox," whereby efforts to 
enhance safety result in increased vulnerability to natural hazards. See Burby, Paradoxes, supra 
note 22, at 173-78. 
133. See DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA 
CHALLENGE-FLOODING IN THE CENTRAL VALLEY iii (2007), available at 
http://www. water.ca.gov I news/newsreleases/2008/l 01507 challenge.pdf. 
134. See Elliot Diringer & Ramon G. McLeod, Floods Warn Valley of Worse to Come I Storms, 
Growth Expose Region's Rising Risk, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1997, at AI. 
135. Id. 
136. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS HURRICANE KATRINA EXTERNAL REVIEW 
PANEL, THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 61-
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The cogmtlve errors this Article has been discussing skew 
perceptions of risk at both the individual and socio-political level. 
This occurs because these errors influence policymakers individually 
and also shape the public's appetite for regulation. Where the 
electorate believes development is relatively risk free, they are likely 
to oppose regulation that will increase the cost of development. 137 
Moreover, sophisticated parties can harness cogmt1ve 
phenomena to advance their political agenda. Timur Kuran and Cass 
Sunstein have identified "availability entrepreneurs" leveraging 
cogmtlve errors in the context of political debates about 
technological risks. 138 Kuran and Sunstein identify circumstances 
where advocates for restrictive policies have highlighted or even 
invented risks to trigger the availability heuristic. 139 Similarly, 
availability entrepreneurs with vested interests in relaxed 
development policies may emphasize, as part of their advocacy, 
examples of development in hazard-prone areas that have not 
experienced catastrophic losses. In so doing, examples of "safe" 
development may more easily come to mind, causing people to 
overestimate safety. 
In addition to the cognitive phenomena discussed above, the very 
fact that people perceive natural disasters as natural may lead to an 
underappreciation of risk. In experimental settings, individuals 
express a substantially greater degree of concern about artificial risks 
than natural risks, even when the risks are of the same 
magnitude. 140 So, people assume they are relatively safe in the face 
of flood risk, even as they demand swift political action in response 
to artificial hazardous substances like those detected at Love 
Canal. 141 
63 (2007), available at http:/ /www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/ ASCE _ News/2009/ 
04_April/ERPreport.pdf (explaining that lack of quantification of risks related to New Orleans 
hurricane protection system meant that "residents ... could not have known the actual risks 
with which they were living"); Burby, Paradoxes, supra note 22, at 176. 
137. As Cass Sunstein has explained, "If citizens believe that they have much to gain and 
little to lose from risk regulation, they will favor risk regulation; leaders should be expected to 
respond to what citizens believe, and their own judgments are influenced by an intuitive kind of 
cost-benefit analysis as well." Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and 
Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 524 (2007). 
138. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 129, at 687-88. 
139. Id. 
140. See W. Kip Viscusi, Carcinogen Regulation: Risk Characteristics and the Synthetic Risk Bias, 
85 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 53-54 (1995). 
141. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 129, at 697-98. 
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A final cognitive error that may affect risk perceptions is known 
as the "affect heuristic," which causes emotion to influence 
cognition, and particularly judgments about risk. The operation of 
the affect heuristic skews risk perception based on emotional 
attachment. 142 So, for example, people tend to perceive things they 
like as being low risk and things they don't like as being high risk. 143 
This may lead to erroneous correlation of risks and benefits, whereby 
that which is beneficial is perceived as being safe and vice versa. 144 
The problem is, of course, that risks and benefits are not always 
correlated, and this may be particularly true in the context of 
development. Property subject to high natural hazards may also have 
amenities that make it particularly attractive for residential or 
commercial development. For example, ocean front property is both 
highly desired for its aesthetic attributes and also high risk. The 
affect heuristic may lead people to discount risks when they have 
emotional attachment to a particular piece of property. In other 
words, a potential homebuyer who forms a rapid emotional 
attachment to a house will be susceptible to overestimating the 
house's safety. 
The symbolism of reconstruction addressed in Part II may itself 
activate the affect heuristic. The rhetoric of armed conflict creates 
social pressure to rebuild as a symbol of resistance and resolve and 
to avoid the appearance of surrender. Thus, policies favoring swift 
reconstruction activate positive emotions, while those disfavoring 
such activities activate negative emotions. Through the affect 
heuristic, these emotional responses become part of the public 
perception of natural hazard risk. Redevelopment, then, is not only 
culturally imperative but is also perceived as a relatively safe 
decision. 
Assessment of redevelopment in the wake of disaster is, 
therefore, vulnerable to a range of cognitive errors. Coupled with the 
symbolic factors affecting risk perception, these factors often militate 
in favor of development even where such development is "irrational" 
in the market sense that risks outweigh benefits. This does not 
mean, of course, that all decisions to build in the face of natural 
142. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 ]. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 2 (2000). 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 13. 
242 
213 Deconstructing Disaster 
hazards are irrational. Indeed, as we shall see in Part IV, the 
structure of American political institutions separates the costs of 
disaster from the benefits of development and consequently creates a 
situation where, from the private landowner's or local government 
official's perspective, overinvestment in development is often highly 
advantageous. 
IV. STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES 
Parts II and III have explained that the cultural and cogmtrve 
context of disaster policy is hostile to restrictive development 
policies. As a result of that context, people invest more heavily in 
hazard-prone areas than common sense or economic reality 
supports, and government officials resist regulation. Effective 
disaster policy also faces obstacles from the very structure of the 
government institutions charged with its promulgation and 
effectuation. Some of these problems arise from relationships unique 
to the American constitutional experience and the principles of 
federalism it embodies. Others are inherent in the democratic 
structures of government more generally. These obstacles create 
substantial incentives for private individuals and government 
officials to facilitate development in hazard-prone areas. 
The first structural obstacle arises from vertical relationships 
between local, state, and federal governments and their respective 
responsibilities for natural disaster policy. 145 To understand those 
relationships, consider Brattleboro, Vermont, a town that lies at the 
confluence of the West River and the much larger Connecticut 
River. 146 Based on flood maps prepared in 1977, the town contains 
approximately 1000 acres in one-hundred-year floodplains. 147 The 
145. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of 
Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 104 (2006). Dispersal of authority across federal, state, 
and local governments also has substantial ramifications for rescue efforts, law enforcement, and 
humanitarian response in the wake of natural disaster. See generally Stephen M. Griffin, Stop 
Federalism Before It Kills Again: Reflections on Hurricane Katrina, 21 ST. ]OHN's]. LEGAL COMMENT. 527 
(2006). 
146. See Map of the Town of Brattleboro, VT., MAPSONL!NE.NET, http:/ /www.mapsonline.net/b 
rattleborovt/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
147. See Brattleboro, Vermont Town Plan Map Series: Flood Hazard Areas, BRATTLEBORO.ORG, 
http://www. brattleboro.org/vertical/ sites/% 7BF60ASDSE-ACSC-4F97 -891A-
615C 172A5783% 7D/uploads/% 7BDC196E51-1 FDA-4CD9-B71A-4A4FDFCOF03D%7D.PDF 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2012); 1 TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO, BRATTLEBORO TOWN PLAN 121 (2004), 
available at http://www. brattleboro.org/vertical/ sites/% 7BFABA8FB3-EBD9-4E2C-91 F9-
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Brattleboro zoning laws largely control land use and development 
within the town, and to a large extent, the town's policies dictate the 
extent of its vulnerability to flooding. 148 Brattleboro's zoning code 
generally prohibits construction within stream channels 
themselves, 149 but allows new development in floodplains so long as 
minimum building standards are met. 150 These standards, while 
locally adopted and enforced, largely reflect the minimum standards 
that the federal government requires for NFIP eligibility. 151 
This is a pretty typical arrangement. Land-use planning and 
regulation of property have long been viewed as central functions of 
local government. That allocation has been consistently endorsed by 
the Supreme Court and featured in an 1868 Supreme Court decision, 
Swift v. Tyson. 152 Swift famously held that federal courts could 
generally interfret the common law without regard to decisions of 
state courts. 15 Swift concomitantly held that the federal courts had 
no independent authority over the "rights and titles to things having 
a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and 
other matters immovable and intra-territorial in their nature and 
character." 154 The commitment to generally-although not 
absolutely-entrust land-use decisions to state and local 
governments has persisted. In 2008, a plurality decision of the 
Supreme Court echoed the views expressed in Swift. As Justice Scalia 
wrote, " [ r] egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and 
local power." 155 
The federal government tinkers with land-use planning at the 
margins through the NFIP and laws like the Coastal Zone 
C74DE6CECDFD%7D/uploads/Ch_lO_Natural_Resources.pdf. Flood maps of this vintage are 
common but recognized to substantially underestimate risks. See, e.g., supra note 26 (discussing 
the failure ofNFIP to maintain up-to-date flood maps). 
148. See generally TOWN OF BRATILEBORO, VT., ZONING ORDINANCE art. Ill,§ 3210 Quly 3, 
2007). 
149. Id. § 3257(d). 
150. See id. § 3255. 
151. See FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM COMMUNITY ENROLLMENT AND 
ELIGIBILITY HANDBOOK, supra note 36. 
152. 41 U.S. I, 8-9 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 
(1938). Even before Erie largely ended the project of federal common law, federal courts had 
already recognized exclusive state control over the law of property, including land use. See id. at 
18-19. 
153. Id. at 9-10. 
154. Id. at 18. 
155. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
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Management Act and Coastal Barrier Resources Act, which create 
incentives for local governments to restrict or at least regulate 
development. 156 On its face, section 404 of the Clean Water Act also 
appears to have substantial implications for flood risk by requiring 
parties seeking to fill wetlands to secure permits from the federal 
government. 157 But regulations that implement the act render this 
tool ineffective because they require the Army Corps of Engineers to 
defer to land-use and zoning decisions made by state and local 
government. 158 The Corps implementation of those regulations has 
been even more favorable to local views. As Oliver Houck has 
explained, for example, robust political opposition in Louisiana to 
any effort to limit wetlands development resulted in a culture at the 
Corps that automatically approved virtually every request for a 
permit to fill wetlands. 159 
The local government, then, decides whether to allow 
development to occur in high-hazard areas, a decision that may 
significantly increase the severity of the natural hazard itself. Local 
governments also exert substantial control over how development 
occurs through building codes, which can require construction 
practices designed to protect against hazards. 160 
156. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (2006); Coastal Barrier 
Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 (2006). Unfortunately, the federal minimum standards 
may become the default in many jurisdictions, leading local government officials to question the 
wisdom of creating obstacles to development that are not required by federal law. See, e.g., 
BRA ITLEBORO SELECTBOARD, MAY 15TH MEETING MINUTES 3 (2007), available at 
http:/ /bit.ly/BrattleboroMinutes ("Tim Cuthbertson asked why we were putting in a more 
stringent standard that is not strictly required. We are putting in obstacles for new development 
and should not be mandated."). For an analysis of the CZMA suggesting that it has caused little 
change in the development practices in states hostile to restrictive land use, see Oliver A. Houck, 
Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed New Orleans and the Gulf Cost South and How It Might 
Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1073-76 (2007). 
157. 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (2006). 
158. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(j) (2) (2011). 
159. Houck, supra note 156, at 1069-73. As Houck explained: "At a time [the early 1980s] 
when, nationally, Corps permit denials averaged two percent, the New Orleans district was 
averaging one-tenth of one percent. Clearly, this was a district and a region with a different 
attitude about protecting wetlands." Id. at 1071. 
160. See, e.g., New York City Building Code, Appendix G § G303.7(1) (2011) (prohibiting 
grading and fill in flood hazard areas "[u]nless such fill is placed, compacted and sloped to 
minimize shifting, slumping and erosion during the rise and fall of flood water and, as 
applicable, wave action"), available at http:/ /publicecodes.cyberregs.com/st/ny/ci-
nyc/b200v08/index.htm?bu= YC-P-2008-000006; City of South Pasedena Florida Building Code 
§ 108-18(A) ("All new construction and substantial improvements shall be anchored to prevent 
flotation, collapse or lateral movement of the structure."), available at 
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Problems arise because local governments have significant 
incentives to underregulate, allowing development to occur where it 
should not and using insufficiently protective practices. 161 Local 
governments typically receive much or all of their funding from 
property taxes, meaning that more development means more tax 
dollars and the ability to provide more services to residents. 
Increasingly, local governments fund public projects based on 
sophisticated financing instruments that turn projected increases in 
tax revenue into present dollars. 162 This practice, called "tax 
increment financing," only increases the pressure on local 
governments to maximize development. 
On the other side of the ledger, local governments pay relatively 
little of the costs of disaster, which are largely displaced to the 
federal government. The federal government has long been in the 
business of ftroviding financial and technical assistance in the wake 
of disasters, 63 and this role has only increased over time. 164 Once a 
federal disaster is declared, which occurs with increasing 
frequency, 165 the Stafford Act authorizes payment from the federal 
treasury to reimburse seventy-five percent or more of the costs local 
governments pay to rebuild public infrastructure, 166 and local 
governments often receive a higher percentage. 
This is precisely what occurred in Vermont following Hurricane 
Irene. FEMA authorized reimbursement of ninety percent of the cost 
http:/ /www.ecode360.com/714 7993. 
161. See Burby, Paradoxes, supra note 22, at 178-81. 
162. See George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses and Abuses 
of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAw. 427 (20 11). Lisa Grow Sun provides a careful description 
of the redevelopment of the Portland, Oregon, waterfront as an example of public funds, 
including over a hundred million in tax increment financing, increasing hazard risk. Sun, Smart 
Growth, supra note 30, at 2189-90. If serious flooding destroys or severely damages the new 
development, Portland would have considerable incentive to secure state or federal disaster 
assistance to enable reconstruction to minimize shortfalls in projected tax revenue already 
dedicated to future bond payments. 
163. See Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time Be 'Tried By Fire"': Disaster Relief and the Origins 
of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 967 (1998). 
164. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE: IMPROVED 
CRITERIA NEEDED TO ASSESS A jURISDICTION'S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND AND RECOVER ON ITS OWN, 
supra note 76, at 9-11 ; see also id. at 29-30 (noting that the current methodology for declaring a 
federal disaster does not accurately account for the ability of state and local governments to 
adequately respond). 
165. See Thomas Frank, 'Disasters' StrainFEMA's Resources, USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 2011, at AI. 
166. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-
5207 (2006). 
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of repairs 167 and reported providing $18 million to the state of 
Vermont and its municipalities by the end of 2011. 168 On top of the 
federal funding, the state agreed to reimburse local governments for 
all remaining costs that exceeded the revenue that would be 
generated by a three-cent tax increase. 169 In Brattleboro, a town that 
has an annual revenue of over $14 million and that sustained 
substantial damage, this translated into a maximum direct cost to 
the town of about $340,000. 170 
The finances of local governments are, of course, influenced by 
more than just direct outlays for repair of public infrastructure. 
Property values may fall in the wake of a natural disaster, particularly 
if residents or business owners incur high recovery costs 
themselves. 171 The financial wellbeing of those residing within a 
jurisdiction affects overall economic health. And, of course, 
democratically elected leaders must be responsive to local concerns. 
Local governments receive only mute forms of those signals, 
however, because individuals suffering losses from disaster also 
receive substantial subsidies. 172 The federal government provides 
167. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, RELEASE No. 4022~080, FEMA WILL GIVE 
VERMONT 90 PERCENT FUNDING FOR IRENE REPAIR WORK (2012), available at 
http://www .fema.gov /news-release/fema-will-give-vermon t -90-percent-funding-irene-repair-
work. 
168. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, RELEASE NO. 4022~072, MORE THAN $72 MILLION 
IN DISASTER AID SUPPLIED TO VERMONT IN 2011 (2011) (hereinafter Dec. 2011 FEMA Report], 
available at http://www. fema.gov /news-release/more-72-million-disaster -aid-supplied-vermont-
2011. 
169. See Memorandum from Sue Minter, Irene Recovery Officer, to Municipal Officials 
Involved in Irene Recovery Quly 11, 2012), available at http://www.trorc.org/pdf/ 
irene/FEMA %20updates%20for%20PA %20July%2020 12.pdf. 
170. !d.; TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (2011), available at 
http:/ /brattleborovtrebuild.govoffice.com/vertical/Sites/% 7BFABA8FB3-EBD9-4E2C-91 F9-
C74DE6CECDFD%7D/uploads/Town~Report~2011~FINAL1 (l).pdf. A report produced by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that Windham County, which contains Brattleboro, 
will eventually receive $35 million in public assistance. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VERMONT 
DR-4022, ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT 7 (2012), available at 
http:/ /vtstrong. vermont.gov /Portals/0/Documents/V ermont ~ Econ ~Impact~ Final %20-
%2042312.pdf. 
171. Where individual property owners bear the cost of recovery the market should 
internalize that cost as a liability attached to the property, thereby reducing the property's 
relative value. Cf David Ariosto, First Irene, Then Sandy: jersey City Recovers, Again, CNN WIRE 
(Nov. 14, 2012), http:/ /www.cnn.com/2012/11/14/us/new-jersey-irene-sandy/index.html 
(quoting jersey City resident as saying "[t]he more this flooding happens ... the lower 
property values wiJI sink" (ellipses in original)). 
172. As will be discussed, significant federal resources are available to home and business 
owners in the wake of a natural disaster. The Stafford Act does require, however, some 
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direct financial assistance in the form of individual grants and loans 
and block grants provided to state and local governments for 
recovery projects. In the wake of Irene, the federal government 
provided $22.7 million in grants and $17.6 million in low-interest 
loans to homeowners and renters, 173 $19 million in loans to 
businesses, 174 and over $20 million in such community development 
block grants. 175 All told, the federal government is expected to pick 
up seventy-five percent of the total $733 million cost of recovering 
from Irene. 176 Beyond the federal funds, local governments typically 
receive further subsidies from the state. The state of Vermont, for 
example, offered to reimburse towns that received reduced property 
taxes in the wake of Irene and also agreed to pay certain costs of 
infrastructure repairs not covered by the federal government. 177 
Natural disasters' costs are not only shifted to the federal and 
state governments, but such events also generate substantial 
charitable donations, making additional funds available to those that 
live and work in areas affected by natural disasters. This charity 
homeowners that have previously received disaster relief to purchase flood insurance to remain 
eligible for future disaster relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 5154a(a) (2006). 
173. See Wilson Ring, Vt Irene Recovery Bill at $733M, More Work to Do, VT. TODAY Qune 15, 
20 12), http:/ /vermonttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=/20 120615/NEWS03/706159860; 
Southeastern Vermont Irene Long Term Recovery Committee, WINDHAM COUNTY VT STATUS INFO. (Nov. 
15, 2011), http:/ /www.windhamstatus.org/2011/11/15/southeastern-vermont-irene-long-term-
recovery-committee. FEMA reports that it provided more than $23.1 million in aid to individuals 
and families and $31.2 million in low-interest disaster loans to small businesses. See Dec. 2011 
FEMA Report, supra note 168. These figures do not include additional funds provided in 2012. 
174. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, RELEASE No. 4022-073, FEDERAL AID FOR IRENE, 
SPRING 2011 FLOODING TOPS $100 MILLION IN VERMONT (2012), available at 
http://www .fema.gov /news-release/federal-aid-irene-spring-20 11-fl ooding-tops-1 DO-million-
vermont; see also U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FACT SHEET -DISASTER LOANS: VERMONT DECLARATION 
#12784 & #12785 (2011), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/ 
VT%2012784%20Fact%20Sheet%20TS%201rene%20Amend%205%20adds%203%20cos%209-
15-11_l.pdf; Irene Disaster Loan Deadline is june 1, TIMES ARGUS (May 14, 2012), 
http:/ /timesargus .com/ artide/20 120514/B USINESS03/705149993/1 006/BUSINESS. 
175. See The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community Development 
Block Grant Disaster Recovery Funding (CDBG-DR), I AM VT. STRONG, 
http:/ /vtstrong.vermont.gov/Home/StateRecovery/HUDCommunityDevelopmentBlockGrant.as 
px (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
176. See Ring, supra note 173. 
177. See Peter Hirschfeld, Winners and Losers as Legislature Closes Session, VT. TODAY (May 6, 
2012), http://www .vermonttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll!artide? AID=/20120506/NEWS03/7050 
69821/-1/NEBJ; Peter Hirschfeld, House Approves Tax Relief for Irene-Ravage Towns and Cities, VT. 
PRESS BUREAU Qan. 5, 2012), http://www.vermontpressbureau.com/house-approves-tax-relief-
for-irene-ravage-towns-and-cities; Irene and jobs, a Record of Results, VERMONT (May 5, 2012), 
http:/ I governor. vermont. gov In ewsroom-irene-and-jobs-a-record -of-results. 
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comes in many forms, from large-scale organizational efforts to 
celebrity concerts. 178 These funds are, in part, used to provide 
services to displaced individuals, but money is often made available 
to rebuild homes and businesses. 179 This, in turn, further reduces 
the amount of the cost of recovery borne directly either by the 
individuals living and working in areas subject to natural hazards or 
the local governments that govern these areas. 
All of these sources of funding substantially dampen financial 
signals to local governments to responsibly manage development in 
areas subject to natural hazards. Local government officials have the 
luxury of adhering to the view that the "free market" should drive 
development because neither the local government, nor its residents, 
will face the full costs of making foolish choices. 180 
That natural disaster aid distorts public policy is not to suggest 
that it should be stopped altogether. In my view, social policy should 
encourage an ethic of helping others that have lost their homes and 
businesses in natural disasters. Catastrophic moments can also build 
international goodwill and feelings of unity that benefit society. 
While engaged in response activities in Vermont following Hurricane 
Irene, one National Guard veteran said, "This is the proudest I've 
been [about] anything I've been involved in-being able to help out 
our neighbors in a time of need." 181 At the same time, it is worth 
considering the reasons that social and charitable resources are 
channeled to those afflicted by events that we term "natural" 
disasters rather than more generally to those in need. That society 
chooses to provide financial compensation to those harmed by 
178. Grace Potter Concerts Raise $300,000 for Flood Relief, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Oct. 22, 
2011, at W7; see also Students Hold Penny Drive to Save Covered Bridges, BURLINGTON FREE 
PRESS, Oct. 22, 2011, at W12; Hallenbeck, supra note 43; Bob Audette, More Irene Money Coming 
to Windham County, CLASSIC HITS 92.7 WKVT Quly 21, 2012), 
http:/ /wkvt.com/20 12/07 /20/More-Irene·money-coming-to-Windham-County /13 777730. 
179. See, e.g., Kimberly Drelich, Kellogg Raises $50,000 for Marine Businesses Harmed by Sandy, 
THE DAY (New London, Conn.) (Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.theday.com/article/ 
20121229/NWS0!/312299976/-l/zip06. In the wake of Superstorm Sandy, the Robinhood 
Foundation provided more than $17 million to relief organizations including those dedicated to 
repairing and rebuilding homes and businesses. See ROBIN HOOD, 
http://www.robinhood.org/rhsandy (last visited jan. 14, 2013). 
180. See Baird Helgeson, Risky Rebuilding, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 5, 2006, at 1. In the wake of 
Hurricane Ivan, the mayor of Pensacola, hard hit by the storm, opposed any restrictions on 
development, suggesting instead that the "free market drives [development], the way it should 
be." I d.; see also PIDOT, supra note 18, at 37. 
181. Hallenbeck, supra note 43, at Al. 
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floods, hurricanes, and other natural events, but is generally more 
reluctant to aid those harmed by events perceived as human caused, 
may largely be a result of the social construction of natural disasters 
as being caused by nature. 182 Moreover, the fact that a natural 
disaster is an event may distract attention away from the desperate 
poverty and needs that many of our most vulnerable citizens 
experience on an ongoing basis. 
In addition to distortions caused by vertical divisions of authority 
between local, state, and federal governments, the relationship 
between neighboring local jurisdictions impedes sensible 
development. This horizontal allocation of natural disaster policy 
vests land-use decisions in local governments whose borders do not 
neatly map onto geographic features that dictate natural hazards. 183 
Because natural boundaries often span political boundaries, the 
benefits and costs of one jurisdiction's development policies may be 
displaced onto neighboring jurisdictions. 
Flood risk is a quintessential example. Development within a 
watershed influences the likelihood and severity of flooding by 
increasing runoff and reducing natural capacity to absorb high water. 
In other words, one town's decision to allow disturbance of natural 
floodplains within its borders may well lead to increased flooding 
within the borders of lower elevation towns. Moreover, towns in 
close proximity to each other often compete for commercial and 
residential development in an effort to channel funding streams into 
their jurisdiction. This dynamic has the potential to lead to a classic 
race to the bottom. Local governments may feel pressure to allow 
land to remain deregulated to attract business, particularly because 
they fear that the decisions of neighboring towns may undo any 
effort to curb vulnerability that they attempt. This concern is not just 
hypothetical. For example, during deliberations by the Brattleboro 
182. As Professor Michelle Landis Dauber has argued, differentiation between losses due 
to "natural" causes and human causes makes little sense from the perspective of those suffering 
losses. See Landis, supra note 163, at 995. In a vivid example of this from early in American 
history, Daubert contrasts the dramatic losses suffered by a sea captain whose valor led to the 
capture and criminal trial of would-be pirates with those of individuals whose homes burned in a 
city-wide fire in Arlington, Virginia. !d. at 967-69. 
183. The vertical and horizontal relationships discussed here are different than the 
horizontal and vertical political externalities that Ben Depoorter has identified as arising from 
disaster management. See Depoorter, supra note 144, at 108-10. This Article discusses the 
relationship between government entities, while Depoorter examined the relationship between 
political actors and their constituents. 
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Selectboard on a proposal to limit new impermeable surfaces within 
floodplains, the concern was raised that the forestry practices of 
surrounding towns contributed to flooding and would undermine 
the new policy. 184 
Misalignment of political and natural boundaries extends beyond 
just the relationship of towns. Many natural systems span state and 
national boundaries, further complicating the policy picture. For 
example, the Connecticut River, which flooded along significant 
portions of its length in Hurricane Irene, 185 finds its source in 
Fourth Connecticut Lake in New Hampshire, flows south along the 
border between Vermont and New Hampshire, and enters 
Massachusetts and eventually Connecticut. Its watershed also 
extends well into Canada. The policy choices of each state and 
neighboring Canadian provinces work in combination to affect flood 
risks along the river's entire length. 186 
Both the vertical and horizontal dynamics described arise roughly 
from economic externalities. The policy choices of local governments 
resulting in increased vulnerability to natural hazards impose 
considerable costs, but neither the local governments themselves, 
nor their constituents, fully bear those costs. Instead, these costs are 
displaced onto state and federal taxpayers, donors, and the residents 
of neighboring jurisdictions. Put another way, the decision of local 
government officials to enact sensible policies to control 
development in areas subject to natural hazards creates some 
benefits felt beyond their borders, which benefits local government 
officials cannot capture and, therefore, have little incentive to 
pursue. 
Beyond these problems, which we might consider economic in 
nature, disaster policy also presents a prime opportunity for 
184. See, e.g., BRAITLEBORO SELECTBOARD, APRIL 17 MEETING MINUTES 2 (2007), available at 
http:/ /bit.ly/BrattleboroMinutes; BRAITLEBORO SELECTBOARD, APRIL 17TH MINUTES 2 (2007), 
available at http://www. brattleboro.org!vertical/Sites/o/o 7BF60ASDSE-ACSC-4F97 -891A-
615Cl72A5783%7D/uploads/%7B04ASBE4C-AAFC-4ESE-8512-4790A373738Bo/o7D.PDF. 
185. See Jim Kinney, Hurricane Irene Still Swelling Rivers; Connecticut Yet to Crest in Holyoke, 
Springfield, REPUBLICAN (Springfield, Mass.), Aug. 29, 2011. 
186. The great rivers of the western United States span jurisdictions too numerous to list 
and have resulted in complex international treaties between the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada to govern flood control projects and the allocation of water. See, e.g., Barbara Cosens, 
Resilience and Law as a Theoretical Backdrop for Natural Resource Management: Flood Management in the 
Columbia River Basin, 42 ENvrL. L. 241, 243 (2012). 
251 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
government capture. 187 That is because the cost of bad policy is both 
broadly distributed (to federal taxpayers, for example) and 
unpredictable, while the benefits of bad policy are highly 
concentrated in a few highly organized and well-funded industries. 
Public choice theory suggests that in such circumstances, 
policymakers disproportionately favor the interests of the few, even 
if doing so undermines social welfare. 188 This means that even 
where ample information about disaster risk exists, there may be "no 
politically powerful constituency ready to support legislators and 
agency officials" advocating for policies to reduce disaster 
vulnerability. 189 Moreover, disaster policy may be particularly subject 
to government capture because of the symbolic and cognitive 
obstacles discussed above. The public misperceives risk and 
overvalues reconstruction as a signal of societal resolve. 190 As a 
result, even where regulation would enhance social welfare, the 
public may provide little or no counterbalance to the significant 
influence wielded by the development community. 
Return again to the debate in Brattleboro about restricting 
development in floodplains. The public debate consistently 
referenced concerns about restricting development, and the 
development community generated opposition. 191 This same 
dynamic plays itself out around the country and on the national 
stage. In California, for example, the development community has 
fiercely opposed development restrictions in floodplains in the 
central valley, where more than 750,000 people already live in 
187. Government capture refers to the often-documented phenomenon whereby a highly-
motivated interest group can disproportionately influence-in other words, "capture"-
government policy. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
2353, 2362 (2007); john S. Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
713,724 (1986). 
188. See, e.g., Depoorter, supra note 145, at 108-09; see also ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FACING 
CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 54-56 (2010); see also 
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 892 
(1987) (discussing origins of the public choice economics account of legislation). 
189. Lazarus, supra note 41, at 1045. 
190. See discussion supra Parts II, III. 
191. Bob Audette, Board Nixes Erosion Hazard Regulation, BRATTLEBORO REFORMER 
(Brattleboro, Vt.), jan. 20, 2010; joel B. Baird, Brook's Rage Cuts Off Brattleboro Residents, 
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Burlington, Vt.), Aug. 30, 2011, at B4; see also Michael Grunwald, 
Wetlands Protection Rules Due; Army Corps Would Slow Development, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 2000, at 
AI; Spencer Hunt, Groups Object to Big Darby Plan; Builders and Landowners Tell State that Proposed 
Protections Go Too Far, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio), Mar. 22, 2006, at Cl. 
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floodplains. 192 In Birmingham, Alabama, soon after forming an 
advocacy organization, business and development interests 
successfully scuttled plans to substantially curtail development in 
the floodplain of Five Mile Creek, which had flooded in 2003 causing 
a billion dollars in damage. 193 And in Brevard County, Florida, a 
large development company lobbied for looser development 
restrictions within the ten-year floodplain. 194 Indeed, developers 
have even opposed requirements to notify potential buyers that 
property lies within a twenty-five-year floodplain. 195 The political 
advocacy of the development industry makes sense since building in 
areas subject to natural hazards and, indeed, responding to natural 
events generates substantial revenue. 196 Economic losses, on the 
other hand, are paid out by the federal treasury and, therefore, 
policies to reduce those losses lack a concentrated constituency. 
Other political dynamics also impede effective disaster policy. 
Natural hazards are probabilistic and require long planning horizons, 
while elected officials tend to have a short-time horizon calibrated to 
achieve reelection. From the perspective of an elected official, gains 
likely to occur during their term in office are more valuable than 
losses that will accrue outside of that time period. 197 So, for 
example, politicians may be more sensitive to an immediate influx of 
tax dollars than to the greater social costs that may not actualize 
until decades in the future. Disaster policy may also fail to get on the 
agenda of policymakers because other issues, such as school funding, 
192. Elliot Diringer & Ramon G. McLeod, Floods Warn Valley of Worse to Come: Storms, 
Growth Expose Region's Rising Risk, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1997, at Al. 
193. See jeff Hansen, New Business Alliance Flexes Its Muscles to Get Its Way; Foes Accuse BARD of 
Putting Its Desires Above Community's, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), Dec. 10, 2006, at 1. 
194. County Delays Wetlands Changes, FLA. TODAY (Melbourne, Fla.),june 3, 2010, at Bl. 
195. See Brian Haas, New Homes Plan Passes, BRADENTON HERALD (Bradenton, Fla.), Aug. 9, 
2002, at Cl. 
196. Insurance companies are an interesting case. They make money off of providing a 
hedge against risk but also face steep losses when natural disasters strike. This dichotomy 
incentivizes the company to reduce vulnerability-either by declining to offer insurance or 
reducing the risks faced by the properties they insure-or find other sources of financing to lay 
off some of their risk. In recent years, the federal treasury has been an attractive target and there 
has been a concerted, although as of yet unsuccessful, effort to secure passage of legislation to 
create federal multi-peril insurance. See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 48-49; Gene Taylor, Federal 
Insurance Reform After Katrina, 77 MISS. L.J. 783, 790 (2008). The business of transacting 
insurance claims has its own constituency. See Russell Grantham, Hitting the Road After 
Catastrophe, ATLANTA).-CONST., Sept. 4, 2011, at 01. 
197. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price 
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 847 (2012). 
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law enforcement, and unemployment, have more immediate 
effects. 198 
V. CONCLUSION 
I have focused on obstacles to sensible disaster policy and they 
present something of a grim picture. The language we use, the 
political systems we rely upon, and even the way that we think 
thwart efforts to regulate behavior in response to natural hazards 
and result in ever-increasing vulnerability. And these obstacles often 
interact, creating a policy landscape particularly hostile to reform. 
The interactions between and among the three obstacles take 
many forms. The discourse of disaster causes people to view 
positively efforts to rebuild because within the metaphor of armed 
conflict, rebuilding means defying the efforts of the enemy and 
failing to rebuild means retreat. The positive emotion this 
symbolism vests in reconstruction may, in turn, trigger the affect 
heuristic, resulting in exaggerated belief about the safety of 
rebuilding in hazardous locations. 
Cognitive errors simultaneously feed back into the symbolic 
value placed on rebuilding in the wake of disaster. People 
systematically underappreciate the degree of risk of building in areas 
subject to natural hazards, making reconstruction appear relatively 
risk free. In other words, people perceive victory over nature as 
relatively easy to achieve because cognitive biases make natural 
hazards appear less dangerous. Where victory appears cheap, courses 
of action that lead to perceived defeat will be treated as particularly 
suspect. 
These cognitive and symbolic obstacles reinforce the perverse 
incentives created by the allocation of governmental authority over 
disaster policy. Local government officials do not only have political 
incentives not to restrict development, but those incentives are 
buttressed by their own cognition and the skepticism of the public 
driven by the cognitive and symbolic dimensions of natural disaster. 
And, as we have seen, government officials often draw on the armed 
conflict metaphor, reinforcing the symbolic value attached to 
reconstruction in the wake of natural disaster. 
198. See MILETI, supra note 16, at 160. 
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Recent history bears out the power of these dynamics. Economic 
losses attributed to natural disasters double every decade, and there 
is no end in sight. 199 Transforming coastlines, riverbanks, and 
mountain forests into houses and storefronts also disturbs fragile 
and important ecosystems, which once provided natural protection 
against disaster. 200 
Still, hope remains. The enormity of economic loss is becoming 
too big to ignore, particularly at a time of increasing scrutiny on 
government spending. The time may finally be ripe for reform. 
However, enacting, implementing, and persisting with sensible 
approaches to natural disasters will require a coordinated approach 
that takes account of the suite of obstacles discussed in this Article. 
None of these obstacles is insurmountable. New institutional 
arrangements can realign regulatory authority and financial 
responsibility. 201 This could take the form of increasing federal 
responsibility for land-use decisions in hazardous areas. The Army 
Corps of Engineers could play this role, at least in part, through 
existing authority under the Clean Water Act. Alternatively, local 
governments could assume increasing financial responsibility for 
recovery, creating incentives for better land-use regulation. Local 
governments could also enter into collaborative partnerships with 
one another to better coordinate development across jurisdictional 
lines.202 Or, states could step in, playing a larger role in both 
planning for natural disasters and paying their price. 
Law that generates public information about disaster risk-for 
example, by providing updated, publicly available, and highly visible 
flood maps or requiring sellers to disclose natural hazard risks to 
would-be purchasers of property-may debias, at least to some 
extent, perceptions of risk. In some circumstances, insurance 
premiums that correctly reflect risk may serve this role. The cost of 
insurance can focus the mind, making concrete probabilistic risks 
that might otherwise be overlooked.203 At the same time, insurance 
199. See FARBER, ET AL., supra note 12, at 3. 
200. See VERCHICK, supra note 188, at 11-24. Robert Verchick suggests that we think of 
natural conditions that provide services, including disaster-prevention or mitigation services, 
such as "green infrastructure," so that they will not get overlooked in development planning. !d. 
201. See Burby, Paradoxes, supra note 22, at 181-86; Hudson, supra note 25, at 1998-99; 
Lazarus, supra note 41, at 1046-53. 
202. See Hudson, supra note 25, at 2057-60. 
203. See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 47. The requirement that owners of homes in one-
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markets do not provide a panacea because they are subject to many 
of the same dynamics this Article has discussed. During the debate 
surrounding reauthorization of the NFIP, virtually everyone agreed 
that premiums offered through the program should be "actuarial."204 
But as often, proponents of government insurance programs call for 
"affordability," and actuarially sound rates for buildings subject to 
high risks will often be unaffordable. 205 Recent legislation made 
some improvements to the NFIP: phasing out explicit subsidies, 
allowing updated flood maps that reflect land-use decisions, and 
considering a longer time frame for determining average losses. 206 In 
the future, the program could be further modified to front-load 
payments so that developers themselves feel the squeeze, and this 
could more effectively calibrate development decisions to the risk of 
natural hazards. 
Political leaders should also consider the language they use in 
discussing disaster. Invoking the metaphor of war can prime a 
demand for reckless reconstruction without regard for the likelihood 
of future losses. Emphasizing the human role in creating 
circumstances in which natural events can lead to devastation may 
facilitate more rational development policy. 
For decades, America has pursued a reckless path of building in 
areas threatened by severe risks from inevitable natural disasters. 
When disaster has struck, America has rebuilt, setting itself up for 
hundred-year floodplains acquire flood insurance to secure federally insured mortgages assists 
with this price-signaling effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(l) (2006). Many individuals subject to 
this legal requirement nonetheless remain uninsured, and the NFIP has struggled to increase the 
number of other homeowners that purchase flood insurance. See LLOYD DIXON, ET AL., THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM'S MARKET PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS, at xvi-xvii (2006). 
204. See generally PIDOT, supra note 18. 
205. See PJDOT, supra note 18, at 15. In one celebrated case, the owner of a Houston-area 
home valued at $115,000 received over $806,000 in insurance payments over eighteen years due 
to sixteen flooding events. See Francesca Ortiz, The Tide is Nigh: Rethinking Urban Flood Management, 
9 CHAP. L. REV. 435, 448 (2006). Risks of this magnitude and frequency may be insurable 
because it is possible to predict the likelihood of an insured event occurring and the amount of 
loss. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 783, 813 (2005). But an actuarially-adjusted premium would likely be unaffordable. That 
would not be a function of the insurance market failing, however, but rather of an irrational 
decision to develop on such disaster-prone property. 
206. See jESSICA GRANNIS, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR, ANALYSIS OF HOW THE FLOOD 
INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012 (H.R. 4348) MAY AFFECT STATE AND LOCAL ADAPTATION 
EFFORTS (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/ 
Analysis%20ofo/o20the%20Fiood%20Insurance%20Reform%20Act%20ofo/o202012.pdf. 
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another round of destruction. As the president of a real estate firm in 
New York explained in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, "[I]f history 
teaches us anything, people always rebuild and they always come 
back."207 Fortunately, some government officials and private 
individuals are beginning to ask the right questions. After 
Superstorm Sandy, the opinion pages of leading newspapers 
broadcast the message that the time has come to rethink our 
approach to building-and rebuilding-in hazard-prone places.208 In 
the wake of Hurricane Irene, a report published by the Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources posed similar questions: "[W]hat will 
we learn from Irene's impacts, knowing that severe flooding may 
continue to become more common? How can we rebuild 
intelligently, incorporating greater flood resiliency in our 
commumnes while protecting our natural environment?"209 Such 
inquiry is far from the norm, and the suite of obstacles one must 
confront in facing disaster policy discussed in this Article have 
historically overcome common sense. But if the nation can 
successfully grapple with these questions and overcome the 
obstacles to disaster policy, the next hurricane may simply be a 
notable weather event and not a natural disaster. 
207. Ariosto, supra note 4. 
208. See, e.g., James D. Fraser, et a!., We're Too Close to the Sea, WASH. PosT, Nov. 21, 2012; 
Margaret Hartley, Effects of Sandy Should Impel Us to Try to Tread Carefully, DAILY GAZETTE (Albany, 
N.Y.), Nov. 4, 2012, at E10; Roger K. Lewis, Heeding the Cruel Housing Lessons of Hurricane Sandy, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2012; Norbet P. Psuty, The Data Is ln. Now We Need Action, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
27, 2012. 
209. See Sacha Pealer, Lessons from Irene: Building Resiliency as We Rebuild, VT. AGENCY OF NAT. 
REs. Qan. 4, 2012), http://www.anr.state.vt.us/anr/climatechange/Pubs/lrene_Facts.pdf. 
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